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HOUSE  PRICES have recently  attracted  unusual  attention  because  for the 
first  time in decades large areas in the United States have experienced 
declining  nominal  house prices. Such house price declines are not un- 
precedented. Between 1929 and 1933, nominal  house prices declined 
nearly 25 percent, although  there was virtually  no real decline.1  And 
more recently, in the early 1980s, the prices of homes in oil-producing 
regions  fell. In Canada,  too, cities such as Vancouver  have experienced 
sharp  price  declines  following  rapid  increases. These episodes have not 
been widespread  enough, however, to dislodge  the view that housing  is 
a solid long-term  investment. This view is largely  based on the experi- 
ence of the 1970s,  when house price inflation  outpaced  overall  price in- 
creases by almost  30 percent. 
Declining  real houses prices are not so unusual.  For the nation  as a 
whole, real house prices have trended  down since the fourth  quarter  of 
1979.  Just  before  the October  1987  stock market  crash, real  prices were 
2.3 percent  lower than  their 1979  levels. By the second quarter  of 1991, 
real prices had declined  another  5.6 percent, with substantially  greater 
real declines in the Northeast  and some parts  of California.  In the New 
York City metropolitan  area, for example, real prices have declined  24 
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percent since their 1987  peak, and San Francisco  has experienced  a 15 
percent decline since mid-1989.  These localized price declines have 
eroded household net worth and contributed  to the stress on many fi- 
nancial  institutions. 
Recent events have inevitably led to speculation about the future 
course  of house prices. A widely cited study  by N. Gregory  Mankiw  and 
David Weil  analyzes  the historical  link  between house prices  and demo- 
graphic  change and concludes that if past patterns  persist, real house 
prices could decline significantly  over the next two decades.2  Although 
their conclusion has been challenged  in the media and in professional 
journals,  the ensuing  debate  has not yielded clear  evidence on what de- 
termines  house prices. 
This paper  presents new evidence on house price determination  and 
the extent to which house prices are set in an efficient  asset market.  It 
begins by sketching three nonexclusive explanations  for house price 
movements during the past three decades: changes in construction 
costs; changes  in the real  after-tax  cost of homeownership;  and  changes 
in demographic  factors. The paper  develops three  empirical  tests to dis- 
entangle  these possible determinants  of house prices. 
The first test exploits data on individual  housing  transactions  to ex- 
amine which types of houses gained value in the late 1970s  and which 
lost value  in the 1980s.  The  results  suggest  that  larger  homes  appreciated 
the most in the early period and declined in value the most in recent 
years. This pattern  supports  the real user cost view. 
The second empirical  test analyzes data on the rates of house price 
appreciation  in a large cross section of cities. Cities with more rapidly 
growing  populations  in the traditional  home-buying  years do not experi- 
ence faster price growth  than other cities. The patterns  of house price 
appreciation  across cities cast doubt on the role of demography  in ex- 
plaining  price  movements,  although  they do not lend support  to the user 
cost view. User cost variation  across cities is relatively  limited, so it is 
more  difficult  to test the importance  of real  user costs using  these data. 
The third  empirical  test focuses on whether  house prices are forward 
looking  and can forecast changes  in local economic conditions, such as 
the growth  of per capita income. The results indicate  that house prices 
do predict the future to some degree, but they also show that lagged 
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changes in a city's real per capita income, as well as the lagged  change 
in its real  house prices, can explain  a substantial  part  of the variation  in 
house price appreciation.  These findings  violate standard  efficient-mar- 
kets theory. A brief look at house price movements  in other countries 
reveals several episodes of sharp  increases and decreases in real house 
prices, suggesting that house prices can be  subject to  speculative 
bubbles. 
The paper concludes that changing  real user costs could be an im- 
portant  contributory  factor  in the house price  rise of the late 1970s.  They 
are less able to explain the data for the 1980s, when real interest rates 
increased  and  real  user costs rose substantially  but  real  house prices de- 
clined  relatively  little. The finding  that  house prices do not behave  as ef- 
ficient  asset prices may be important  for understanding  the past decade, 
during  which homeowners may have only slowly recognized that the 
rapid  house price appreciation  of the 1970s  would not be repeated. In- 
vestor expectations  of rapid  house price appreciation  through  much of 
the 1980s  can resolve the puzzle of why house prices did  not fall  further. 
This raises the possibility  that investors may extrapolate  the recent de- 
cline in real house prices and conclude that the real carrying  costs of 
houses are  particularly  high,  hence reducing  the demand  for housing  and 
the level of house prices still further. 
Theories of House Price Fluctuations 
House prices  are of more  than  conversational  interest  to economists. 
Owner-occupied  housing accounts for a greater  fraction  of household 
net worth than corporate  equity. In 1990, when household net worth 
equaled $17.1 trillion, the gross value of owner-occupied  homes was 
$4.6 trillion, nearly double the $2.4 trillion  worth of corporate  equity 
owned by households.3  Movements of real house prices have large ef- 
fects on household  wealth,  and  potentially  on consumer  spending.4  High 
house prices  relative  to building  costs also call forth  increased  construc- 
3. Federal  Reserve  Board,  Balance Sheets of the U.S. Economy,  May 1991. 
4.  Skinner  (1989),  Manchester  and  Poterba  (1989),  and  Bosworth,  Burtless,  and  Sabel- 
haus  (1991)  explore  the effect  of housing  wealth  on household  consumption.  The  latter  two 
studies provide weak evidence that housing capital gains translate into increased 
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tion activity and channel resources to the building  sector. Only one- 
quarter  of all new single-family  homes are sold before construction 
starts  (26.7 percent in 1990).  The remaining  three-quarters  of new con- 
struction  is started  as a speculative  venture  by the builder;  more than  a 
third  of new homes are not sold until  after they are completed.5  House 
prices play a role similar  to that  of the price of corporate  stock in James 
Tobin's  q-model  of investment. 
Relative to the GNP deflator, the quality-adjusted  price of a new 
home in 1990  is more  than  20 percent  higher  than  in the early 1960s.  Fig- 
ure 1 plots the relative  price of constant-quality  new homes for the pe- 
riod since 1963, when the Census Bureau  began reporting  this series. 
Most of the appreciation  in house prices took place during  the 1970s, 
when real prices rose almost 30 percent. Since then, real house prices 
have declined. 
The national  data  presented  in figure  1  mask  heterogeneity  across dif- 
ferent regions. More  disaggregated  Census Bureau  data  reveal average 
annual  house price appreciation  of 1.1 percent in the West and 1.2 per- 
cent in the Northeast  during  the 1963-90  period,  with  real  price  declines 
of 0.1 percent a year in the South and Midwest. The timing  of the real 
price changes also differs between regions. In the 1970s, real prices 
more than doubled in the West, while homes in the Northeast gained 
only 17  percent.  During  the late 1980s,  real  prices declined  in all regions 
except the Northeast. Despite reductions  at the end of the decade, real 
prices in the Northeast climbed 39 percent between 1980 and 1990. 
Homes in the West declined in value by nearly 10 percent, and those 
in the South and Midwest  lost more than 20 percent  of their  real value. 
Census  regions  may aggregate  too much  for studying  housing  prices, 
but they are the smallest  jurisdictions  that have relatively  long time se- 
ries of quality-adjusted  house prices.6  More  disaggregate  data  are avail- 
able from the National Association of Realtors (NAR), which reports 
quarterly  median  house prices  for a set of 115  standard  metropolitan  sta- 
tistical areas (SMSAs). However, for many SMSAs, the data  do not go 
5.  Bureau of the Census,  Construction Reports C-27. 
6. There  are some high-quality  indexes for smaller  jurisdictions  and shorter  time pe- 
riods, such as Case and Shiller's  (1989)  indexes for four cities and Pollakowski's  (1988) 
indexes  for 22 cities between 1974  and 1983. James M. Poterba  147 
Figure 1.  Average Real Price of New Single-Family Houses,  1963-90 
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Source: Bureau  of the Census.  The figure  shows  an index  of the average  price  of a constant-quality  home  relative 
to the GNP deflator,  with 1982  =  100. 
back  very far. Only  39 SMSAs, with  a 1990  population  of 76 million  peo- 
ple, provide  data  for the 1980-90  period. 
Median  prices suffer  from a number  of well-known  limitations,  prin- 
cipally their failure to control for quality variation over time. They 
nevertheless  appear  to capture  broad  price movements  in housing  mar- 
kets. The Case-Shiller  repeat-sale  price indexes move in the same di- 
rection as the median  sales prices in the cities where they can be com- 
pared, but inflation  calculated  from median  prices can differ  from that 148  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1991 
estimated  with repeat-sale  indexes by several percentage  points.7  Still, 
the NAR data  are the best information  currently  available  across cities. 
The 39 SMSAs with 10  years of NAR data  display  significantly  differ- 
ent appreciation  rates. The standard  deviation  of their 1980-90  apprecia- 
tion rates is 24.1 percent. Four of the 39 cities averaged  annual  real ap- 
preciation  rates of more than 4 percent, and 18 cities experienced  real 
house price declines. This wide dispersion  suggests the potential  value 
of city-level data  for analyzing  house price determination. 
The NAR median  house prices  reflect  the combined  cost of structures 
and land. The Census Bureau  constant-quality  price indexes, by con- 
trast,  attempt  to value  only structures.  An important  question  in analyz- 
ing  recent  house price  declines is whether  they reflect  only reduced  land 
values or whether  they include both lower land and structures  prices. 
Because there are relatively  few sales of buildable  tracts in some estab- 
lished SMSAs, it is often difficult  to disentangle  land and structures 
prices. 
One source of data  on land  costs is the Urban  Land  Institute's  (ULI) 
semidecadal  survey of land costs.8 The survey asks developers  to price 
a standard,  improved,  10,000-square-foot  lot in different  cities. The ULI 
has surveyed 30 cities four times in the past 16 years, starting  in 1975. 
The correlation  across cities between the NAR median  house price and 
the ULI land  price  for 1990  is 0.85. It is difficult  to assign any causal  in- 
terpretation  to this result, since land  prices and house prices are  jointly 
determined. 
A more  important  question  is the share  of the variation  in changes  in 
house prices that can be explained by movements in land prices. The 
aggregate  pattern  of house price movements  is not coincident  with that 
for real land  prices. Averaging  the land costs in the 30 ULI cities gives 
19.5  percent  real land price growth  between 1975  and 1980,  3.0 percent 
between 1980  and 1985,  and 13.5 percent between 1985  and 1990.  Real 
house prices rose faster in the late 1970s  and fell during  the 1980s.  The 
7.  See Case  and  Shiller  (1987).  I found  additional  support  for  the usefulness  of median 
prices in a simple analysis of house sales in my hometown  (Belmont, Massachusetts). 
Houses are re-assessed  to current  market  value every three years, so within  assessment 
cycles, assessed  value  provides  an  index  of house  quality.  I analyzed  the set of house  sales 
during  the 1987-89  period  and  found  that  the assessed value  of the house with  the median 
sales price  in each of the three  years  varied  relatively  little. This suggests  that  the quality 
bias  from  analyzing  median  house  prices  would  be small. 
8. These  data  are  reported  in Black  (1990). James M. Poterba  149 
ULI data may understate  actual  land  price inflation  in the early period. 
A comparison  series of land costs, the U.S. Department  of Agriculture 
(USDA) index  of the average  price  of farmland  in the United  States, rose 
39.4 percent  (in real  terms)  between 1975  and 1980. 
The ULI and  NAR price  data  can be differenced  for the small  sample 
of cities with historical  NAR price  reports.  Regressing  the five-year  per- 
centage change in real median  house prices, A ln Pi,, on the percentage 
change in real land costs over the same period, A ln Li,, and using all 
available  five-year  intervals  from  the ULI data  set yields: 
(1)  A ln Pi  =  - 0.025  + 0.288  A ln-Lit 
(0.025)  (0.092)  R2 =  0.270; N  =  29. 
This suggests that  a surprisingly  small  fraction  of the variation  in house 
prices may  be explained  by changing  land  costs. 
A Framework  for Explaining House Price Movements 
The housing market  actually consists of two markets:  one for the 
stock of existing  houses, which determines  the price of houses, and an- 
other for the flow of new construction,  which determines  the level of 
new investment.9  Shocks to either of these markets  can affect house 
prices. 
Equilibrium  in the market  for existing owner-occupied  houses re- 
quires  that  homeowners,  in their  role as investors, earn  the same return 
on housing  investments  as on other  assets. This requires 
(2)  RH/PH  = [(-  0)(i + TP)  +  8  +  at+m-  Re 
where  RH  denotes the marginal  value  of the rental  services per  period  on 
owner-occupied  homes, PH the price  of existing  houses, 0 the investor's 
marginal  tax rate, i the nominal  interest  rate, Tp  the property  tax rate as 
a share  of house value, 8 the depreciation  rate on housing  capital,  ox  the 
9. This framework  is developed in Kearl (1979), Poterba  (1984), Topel and Rosen 
(1988),  and  many  other  papers.  These studies  ignore  the fact that  there  are many  types of 
houses, differentiated  by location, quality, and other characteristics.  In some of these 
many markets,  gross investment  may be zero. The potentially  important  nonnegativity 
constraints  on gross housing  investment  are not considered  when all housing  is aggre- 
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risk  premium  required  on assets with  the risk  characteristics  of housing, 
m the maintenance  cost per unit value, and  1e  the investor's expected 
rate of nominal  house price appreciation.  Both interest payments and 
property  taxes can be deducted  from  federal  income  taxes. 
The housing stock at the beginning  of each period is determined  by 
past investment.  The housing stock in turn  determines  RH. All but one 
of the other  parameters  in equation  2, the expected inflation  rate, are  ex- 
ogenous to the housing  market.  Closing  the model and determining  the 
level of house prices therefore  requires  some choice Of Se. 
The most theoretically  appealing  model  of expected housing  inflation 
imposes rational  expectations  on housing  investors and recognizes the 
link  between  the current  level of house prices and  future  housing  invest- 
ment. An investment  supply equation  relates the flow of net new con- 
struction,  Ht -  Ht-  , to the ratio  of house prices to construction  costs, 
PHIC: 
(3)  Ht  -  =  (PHt/Ct) -  bHt- I 
Under the perfect foresight assumption  that re  =  (PHt+l  -  PHt)/PHt, 
equations  2 and 3 become a pair of difference  equations  in Ht and PHt 
that can be solved forward  to determine  the initial  price  of housing.  10  In 
this framework,  an increase  in the real  price of houses could arise from 
supply  shocks  that  raise  current  or  future  construction  costs or  from  cur- 
rent or anticipated  future demand  shocks that raise the rental service 
value of the owner-occupied  housing  stock. 
The model of house price determination  can also be closed with as- 
sumptions  other than  rational  expectations  about house price changes. 
Recent survey research  suggests that housing  market  participants  form 
extrapolative  expectations.11  Such a backward-looking  process for set- 
ting  price  expectations  would  permit  periods  of systematic  overbuilding 
in the housing  market  and  also would  account  for predictable  patterns  in 
the excess returns  on houses. The claim  that  demographic  changes  dur- 
ing  the 1970s  affected  house prices, even though  these changes  could  be 
forecast two decades earlier, implicitly assumes that housing market 
participants do  not form rational expectations about future price 
changes. How expectations  of future  house prices are set and whether 
10. Poterba  (1984)  provides  a more  detailed  solution. 
11. Case  and  Shiller  (1988). James M. Poterba  151 
Figure  2. House  Prices  Relative  to Construction  Costs, 1963-90 
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Source:  Bureau of the Census. The figure shows the ratio of the Census Bureau's price index for a constant-quality 
new home to the Boeckh  construction  cost  index.  The ratio is indexed  with  1982 =  100. 
the asset market  for houses can be viewed as efficient  are  therefore  cen- 
tral  questions  for understanding  the behavior  of U.S. house prices dur- 
ing the past three  decades. 
There  are three  popular  explanations  for the rise in house prices dur- 
ing the 1970s.  The first  relies on shocks to construction  costs. 12  System- 
atic changes  in construction  costs could  raise  house prices  relative  to the 
GNP deflator.  Figure  2 plots the Census Bureau's  price index  for a con- 
12. See Diamond  (1984)  for an exposition  of this view. 152  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
stant-quality  new home divided  by the Boeckh construction  cost index. 
The latter  includes  the cost of labor  and  materials  for a residential  struc- 
ture but not the cost of land. The figure  shows a 16 percent rise in the 
price-to-cost  ratio  during  the 1970-80  period, approximately  half  the in- 
crease in house prices relative  to the GNP deflator.  13 
A second explanation  for rising  house prices in the 1970s  is a favor- 
able and unexpected  demand  shock resulting  from  the interaction  of in- 
flation  and  the tax system. The U.S. tax code allows homeowners  to de- 
duct nominal interest payments in  computing taxable income,  as 
indicated  in equation  2. If nominal  interest rates rise only one for one 
with expected inflation,  the after-tax  cost of borrowing,  (1 -  O)i  -  ,e, 
declines as expected inflation  rises. This effect is more pronounced  for 
high-tax  rate  households  and  should  therefore  increase  their  demand  for 
housing  relative  to that  of low-income  households.  14 
The tax changes in the 1980s reduced marginal  tax rates for many 
households, but especially for those with high incomes. Other things 
equal, these reforms  should  have raised  the marginal  cost of housing  for 
high-income  homeowners  and depressed the prices of homes typically 
held by these households.15 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also raised 
standard  deductions and reduced the fraction of the population who 
would itemize if they were not homeowners, reducing  the demand  for 
homeownership  at lower  incomes  but  not by as much  as for high-income 
households.  16 
13. The most important  component  of the cost increase  in the 1970s  was the cost of 
materials.  Real  lumber  prices  rose 126  percent  during  the decade,  and  the wholesale  price 
index  for all construction  materials  rose 32 percent. 
14. Feldstein  (1980),  Hendershott  (1980),  Summers  (1981),  and  Poterba  (1984)  discuss 
this  explanation  for the 1970s  experience  in some detail.  Van  Order  and  Dougherty  (1991) 
provide  direct  evidence supporting  the importance  of real  user costs in housing  demand. 
The sensitivity  of nominal  interest  rates to expected  inflation  remains  an unresolved  em- 
pirical  issue, as Mishkin  (1991) explains, but during  the 1970s a one-for-one  increase 
seemed  plausible. 
15. The 1981  tax  reform  also reduced  average  tax  burdens  on high-income  households. 
This increment  to after-tax  income could have partly  offset the demand  reduction  from 
higher  real  user  costs. 
16. In general  equilibrium,  the tax treatment  of rental  and owner-occupied  housing 
must  be considered  in  determining  tenure  choice. The  Tax  Reform  Act of 1986  significantly 
raised  the cost of supplying  rental  housing.  In the long run, as this reduces  the supply  of 
rental  housing  and  drives  up real  rents, it could provide  a countereffect  to the changes  in 
the standard  deduction. See Berkovec and Fullerton  (1989)  for a more complete dis- 
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Table 1.  Real User Costs of Homeownership, by Household Income,  1970-90 
Percent 
Adjusted  gross income of 
Method  of calculation  household  (1990 dollars) 
and year  $30,000  $50,000  $250,000 
Calculated  with  actual tax rates, 
actual mortgage  interest  rates, and 
expected inflation  rates 
1970  11.09  10.76  7.47 
1975  9.42  8.75  5.06 
1980  10.57  9.68  4.48 
1985  13.08  11.84  8.55 
1990  13.24  11.67  11.67 
Calculated  with  actual tax rates, 
constant mortgage  interest  rates, and 
constant expected inflation  rates 
1970  11.15  10.86  8.01 
1975  11.19  10.65  7.68 
1980  11.28  10.74  7.59 
1985  11.46  10.65  8.49 
1990  11.55  10.38  10.38 
Source:  Author's calculations;  see Poterba (1990) for further details.  All cases  assume  a property tax of 2 percent 
of property value,  a risk premium for real estate  investment  of 4 percent,  annual maintenance  costs  of 2.5  percent 
of  home  value,  and an annual real depreciation  rate of  1.4 percent  for residential  structures.  In the top panel,  the 
mortgage  interest  rate  is  the  annual  average  effective  rate on  all  newly  issued  conventional  mortgages,  and  the 
expected  inflation rate is measured as the average CPI inflation rate over the previous five years. In the bottom panel, 
the mortgage interest rate is held constant  at 7 percent and the expected  inflation rate is held constant at 3 percent. 
The user cost  of homeownership  (c)  is defined as 
c  =  [(1  -  0)(i  +  rp)  +  8 +  a +  tn  -  se], 
where the various terms are defined in the text. 
Table 1 and figure  3 show the user cost of homeownership  for three 
different  income  levels during  the past  two decades. The top part  of table 
1 shows the effect of the tax code at five-year  intervals  using interest 
rates and expected inflation  rates prevailing  at the time, thus indicating 
the net change  in actual  incentives  for homeownership.  The bottom  part 
considers  the user cost for a fixed  pattern  of interest  rates and  expected 
inflation  rates, thereby  isolating  the effect of tax changes. 
Real user costs for most households  declined  between 1970  and 1980 
and then increased  through  the 1980s.  These changes are most striking 
for high-income  households. For a family of four with 1990 adjusted 
gross income  of $250,000,  the user cost in 1970  was 7.5 percent  of house 
value; by 1980  it had declined to 4.5 percent. Rising real interest rates 
and  falling  marginal  tax rates increased  this user cost to 11.7  percent  by 154  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
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1990.  Assuming  a price  elasticity  of demand  of -  1.0  for owner-occupied 
housing,17  these changes in user costs could have large  effects on both 
housing  demand  and house prices. 
The user cost changes  for a household  with a 1990  adjusted  gross in- 
come of $50,000  follow the same pattern  but are less pronounced.  Dur- 
ing the 1970s,  the real user cost was higher  for this household  than  for 
its higher-income  counterpart:  10.8 percent in 1970  and 9.7 percent in 
1980. The changes for low-income homeowners, with 1990 adjusted 
gross income of $30,000, are smaller  still and sensitive to whether the 
household itemizes deductions for tax purposes. For nonitemizing 
17. See Rosen  (1985). James M. Poterba  155 
households, the user cost declined as real interest  rates fell in the mid- 
1970s  but was roughly  the same in 1970  and 1980. 
Table 1 shows that  most of the variation  in user costs during  the 1970s 
was due to rising nominal  interest rates and falling real rates, not to 
changes  in the tax system. During  the 1980s,  tax changes  played  a more 
important  part in explaining  changes in user costs, especially for high- 
income households. 
Figure  3, when compared  with  figure  1, illustrates  the difficulty  of ex- 
plaining  house price movements on the basis of changing  user costs. 
House prices rose during  the late 1970s  as user costs fell, but they did 
not fall as real  user costs rose during  the 1980s.  Another  factor  is needed 
to explain  the absence of a house price  decline in the past decade.  18 
The third  prominent  explanation  of the rise in house prices in the late 
1970s,  which  focuses on demography,  may  provide  the missing  factor.  19 
Most individuals  increase their housing consumption  substantially  be- 
tween the ages of 20 and  34, frequently  as a result  of starting  a family  and 
often in association  with a switch from rental  to owner-occupied  hous- 
ing. The fraction  of the population  in this age group  is therefore  an im- 
portant  determinant  of the change  in housing  demand. 
Mankiw and Weil argue that in an efficient market, demographic 
changes such as the entry of a large cohort into the 20-34 age bracket 
should  be anticipated  and therefore  should not affect asset prices. The 
U.S. baby  boom in the 1950s  should  have affected  house prices then, as 
rational  investors recognized  that the "boomers"  would boost housing 
demand  two decades later. Despite this prediction  of rational  models, 
the entry  of the baby-boom  generation  into its prime  homebuying  years 
coincided with a rapid  increase in real house prices, and Mankiw  and 
Weil find  a strong  correlation  between demographic  demand  for owner- 
occupied  housing  and  real  house prices. This correlation  underlies  their 
forecast that the entry of much smaller "baby bust" cohorts into the 
housing  market  during  the 1990s  could  result  in falling  real  house prices. 
This forecast has provoked many rebuttals,  but the ensuing debate 
has obscured  two central  points of wide agreement.  First, demographic 
18. Hendershott  (1988a)  discusses the possible  effects of slowing  productivity  growth 
in construction  and  rising  real  incomes  as other  factors  explaining  house  price  changes. 
19. The role of demography  has been emphasized  by Mankiw  and Weil (1989)  but is 
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factors such as the number  and characteristics  of households  do affect 
housing  demand  and should  therefore  affect prices; the critical  point of 
disagreement  is the timing  of these effects.20  Second, demographic  fac- 
tors are not the only force affecting  house prices. The empirical  issue is 
the fraction  of the variation  in house price movements  that can be ex- 
plained  by demography. 
Relative Appreciation  of Different Sized Houses 
The alternative  explanations  of real  house price  movements  make  dif- 
ferent  predictions  concerning  the relative  appreciation  of different  types 
of houses. The construction  cost view predicts  that  if housing  inputs  do 
not differ  much, then different  houses should  experience  roughly  equal 
rates of appreciation.  The user cost analysis implies an increase in the 
relative demand for the houses typically purchased by high-income 
households  during  the 1970s  and  a decline  in the 1980s.  This should  have 
translated into lower appreciation  rates for these, generally larger, 
houses than  for smaller  ones. 
The demographic  explanation  for price changes suggests  just the op- 
posite. The entry  of baby  boomers  into the housing  market  should  have 
boosted the demand  for starter  houses relative  to larger  trade-up  homes 
in the late 1970s  and 1980s.  The 1989  Chicago  Title and Trust  survey of 
homebuyers,  for example, shows that the average  price of homes pur- 
chased by repeat buyers is 1.34 times greater  than the price of homes 
purchased  by first-time  buyers.2"  If housing supply adjusts  slowly, the 
demographic  shifts of the 1970s should have raised the prices of both 
new and existing small  houses relative  to those of larger  ones. 
This section presents  two types of evidence on the relative  apprecia- 
tion of different  types of houses. The first  uses data  from  the Census  Bu- 
reau's quarterly  survey of new-home sales to compare  the relative ap- 
preciation rates of  houses  with different structural characteristics 
between 1974  and 1989.22  The second exploits data on repeat  sales of a 
20. If the elasticity  of new construction  with respect to prices is high, as McFadden 
(1990)  argues,  then even large  changes  in housing  demand  should  result  in relatively  brief 
deviations  of house prices  from  their  underlying  replacement  costs. 
21. Chicago  Title  and  Trust  (1990). 
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smaller  group  of houses to analyze whether  more expensive houses ap- 
preciated  by more, or less, than  smaller  houses during  the 1970s. 
The Census Bureau  collects data on a large random  sample  of new- 
home sales each quarter.  The data  contain  information  on the sale price 
and on some basic features  of each house. These data are then used to 
construct  a hedonic index of real house prices.23  This involves estimat- 
ing regressions  for each quarter  (t) of the form 
(4)  In (Pit) -  Xitlt  +  Eit, 
where  Pit  is the sale price  of the new house, Xit  is a vector of house char- 
acteristics, and  Eit  iS  the residual.  The time subscript  on the coefficient 
vector Pt recognizes that  a different  parameter  vector is estimated  each 
quarter. 
The predicted  purchase  price in quarter  t of a constant-quality  house 
with attributes  X is then  Pt  exp [X,J.  The house price  index is 
(5)  t=  /Po =  exp [X(P3t  - 
where X denotes the characteristic  vector for the average  house sold in 
the base year, 1987.  The estimated  hedonic coefficients can be used to 
estimate the price changes for houses with many different  characteris- 
tics, not just for the average 1987  house. To compare  large and small 
houses, I defined  a starter  home (with  characteristics  Xs)  and  a trade-up, 
or upper-income,  home (XT). The starter  home contains 1,200 square 
feet of living  space, and  the trade-up  home contains  3,000 square  feet.24 
The Census Bureau hedonic algorithm  relates the logarithm  of the 
house price to housing  characteristics.25  Estimates of 'it for this model 
are available  for 1977-89.  These coefficients  can be used to estimate  ap- 
preciation  rates over various three-year  subperiods  for the starter  and 
trade-up  houses. For starter  houses, the three-year  appreciation  rate is 
defined  in the following  equation: 
23. Follain,  Ozanne,  and  Alburger  (1979)  discuss  alternative  approaches  to measuring 
change  in real  house  prices,  noting  both  the advantages  and  limitations  of the hedonic  ap- 
proach. 
24. The other  characteristics  of the starter  home  include  no fireplace,  fewer than  two 
bathrooms,  no garage,  two or fewer  bedrooms,  and  no air  conditioning.  The  other  charac- 
teristics  of the trade-up  home include  two or more fireplaces,  three  or more bathrooms, 
four  or more  bedrooms,  and  air  conditioning. 
25. The  Census  Bureau  has published  a constant-quality  house  price  index  since 1963, 
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Table 2.  Appreciation of Trade-up Homes Relative to Starter Homes, 
by Region,  1977-89 
Percent 
Region  Entire 
Time  United 
period  Northeast  Midwest  South  West  States 
1977-80  29.5  29.7  1.2  8.9  11.7 
(7.3)  (5.0)  (4.3)  (3.4)  (4.5) 
1980-83  -9.1  20.9  7.2  7.2  7.7 
(8.1)  (5.6)  (4.4)  (4.3)  (5.0) 
1983-86  -21.1  -  24.9  -5.3  -16.7  -  13.2 
(7.9)  (5.9)  (4.3)  (4.6)  (5.1) 
1986-89  -18.5  -5.0  17.8  1.3  5.6 
(9.1)  (6.9)  (5.1)  (7.0)  (6.4) 
Source: Author's  calculations  using  Census  Bureau  data. Entries  correspond  to the differential  appreciation  rates 
of trade-up  (7) and starter  (S) homes  computed  as 
In  PrTtPT,t-3  -  In  PS,IPS,.-3  =  (XT -  Xs) (Oft  -  1-3), 
where  XT and  Xs are  vectors  of characteristics  for the two types  of homes  and i is the vector  of hedonic  coefficients 
used  in the Census  Bureau's  house  price  index  algorithm.  The  standard  error  of this  expression,  shown  in parentheses, 
is [(XrT  -  Xs)' [Var  (,)  + Var  (t_3)]  (XT  -  Xs)1I"2  since  the two sets of parameter  estimates  are based  on different 
data  sets and  are  therefore  independent.  Statistics  for  the United  States  are  a weighted  average  of the regional  values, 
with weights  proportional  to the sample  size in each regional  regression. 
(6)  In WSPS,tl,-3)  =  XS(Pt  -  Pit-3)- 
An analogous  definition  yields the appreciation  rate  for trade-up  homes. 
Table 2 reports estimates of the relative appreciation  rates for the 
starter  and  trade-up  houses in each of the four  census regions,  as well as 
for the United States as a whole. The results  suggest  that  different  types 
of houses appreciated  at significantly  different  rates during  the 1977-89 
period;  they also display  important  subsample  variation  in these relative 
appreciation  rates. The finding  of differential  appreciation  rates is diffi- 
cult to reconcile with supply shocks to the construction  sector, since 
these presumably  affect high-  and  low-value  houses similarly. 
The broad  patterns  of relative  house price movements  are consistent 
with the importance  of changing  real  user costs. During  the 1977-80  pe- 
riod, when  rising  inflationary  expectations  combined  with  high  marginal 
tax rates to reduce user costs for high-income  households, trade-up 
houses appreciated  more than starter  homes. During  the 1980-83 and 
1986-89  periods, the hypothesis of equal appreciation  rates cannot be 
rejected  at standard  confidence  levels for the pooled national  data. Be- 
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Tax Reform  Act of 1986  combined  to raise  real  user costs more  for high- 
income than  for low-income  households, the appreciation  rate of large 
homes  was substantially  lower than  that  of smaller  houses. The national 
estimate suggests that the appreciation  of trade-up  homes was 13 per- 
cent lower than  that of starter  homes, with the largest  effects observed 
in the Northeast  and  Midwest. 
Although  more  than  half  of the appreciation  in real house prices dur- 
ing the 1970s  occurred  after 1977,  the absence of comparable  pre-1977 
hedonic  coefficients  is an unfortunate  limitation.  For this earlier  period, 
the Census  Bureau  used a linear  rather  than  a logarithmic  hedonic  speci- 
fication, and the set of explanatory  variables  differed  from that in the 
current index. Calculations  similar to those reported in table 2, but 
based  on the earlier  hedonic  models, show that  trade-up  houses appreci- 
ated  by 2.1 percent  more  than  starter  houses  for the 1974-77  period,  with 
the largest  gains  in the Northeast  (4.3 percent)  and  the Midwest  (5.7 per- 
cent).26  Since expected inflation  was rising during  these years, these 
findings  provide  further  support  for the real  user cost model. 
The hedonic approach,  which provides the basis for the foregoing 
analysis, is subject to a number  of well-known  deficiencies. A better 
house price  index  involves analyzing  repeat sales of a sample  of houses. 
Karl Case and Robert  Shiller  use this method  to construct  house price 
indexes  for Atlanta,  Chicago,  Dallas, and  Oakland.27  Their  data  can also 
be used to investigate  the relative appreciation  of starter  and trade-up 
houses. Since their  data  set does not include  information  on house char- 
acteristics,  houses must  be stratified  as large  or small  solely on the basis 
of their  transaction  prices. 
To illustrate  the procedure,  consider  the sample  of all houses sold in 
Atlanta  in 1974.  Since expensive houses will typically  be purchased  by 
high-income  (and  high-tax rate) households, the real user cost analysis 
suggests that houses that were relatively  expensive in 1974  should ap- 
preciate more in the second half of the 1970s  than their less expensive 
counterparts.  The demographic  explanation  suggests  the opposite. 
This proposition  can be tested as follows. Consider  all houses that 
26. Parameter  covariance  matrices  for the pre-1977  hedonic  models  are  not available, 
so it is not possible  to assess the statistical  significance  of this difference. 
27. See Case and  Shiller  (1987).  Shiller  (1991)  discusses  a number  of issues associated 
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sold in 1974  and  again  k years later. Define  Ri as the average  annual  ap- 
preciation rate for house i over the k subsequent years: Ri  =  (Ilk) 
ln (Pi,t+k1Pi).  Since  the  strongest  predictions  from the real user cost 
model  contrast  houses at the top and  bottom  of the house price  distribu- 
tion, I compute the difference in actual appreciation  rates between 
houses in the first  and  fourth  quartiles  of the 1974  house price distribu- 
tion. I also estimate the difference  in appreciation  rates for houses be- 
tween the top octile and the lower quartile  of the house price distri- 
bution. 
The test above compares  houses that sold in two particular  years. In 
the Case-Shiller  repeat-sales  data, however, relatively  few houses sell 
in any particular  pair of years. To expand the data set, I compute the 
average  annual  appreciation  rates for all houses with a first  transaction 
date between January  1970  and December 1973  and a second transac- 
tion date between January  1979  and  December 1982.28 
A potential  difficulty  with this technique  is that a house's estimated 
quartile  at first sale is a noisy measure  of its true quartile.  If measure- 
ment errors  are uncorrelated  across sales for each house, houses that 
are  observed  high  in the price  distribution  at first  sale will tend  to exhibit 
lower appreciation  rates  than  those in the bottom  of the first-price  distri- 
bution. The rank  for each house is therefore  determined  by computing 
its average real transaction  price using the consumer price index and 
then  by finding  where  this  property  ranks  in the distribution  of real  house 
prices. 
Table  3 presents  summary  statistics  regarding  house prices  in the four 
cities with repeat-sales  data. The center panel reports  the real price for 
houses at the 25th  and 75th  percentiles  of the distribution  for each city. 
In  Atlanta  and  Dallas, a home  at the 25th  percentile  sold  for slightly  more 
than  half  as much  as one at the 75th  percentile.  The difference  is smaller 
in the other two cities. The lower panel of table 3 shows the marginal 
tax rates that would  face households  buying  homes at the 25th  and 75th 
percentiles.29  In all four  cities, the trade-up  buyer  (top  octile) had  a mar- 
28. The  average  annual  appreciation  rate  is computed  over somewhat  different  sample 
periods  for  different  houses  depending  on the particular  dates  when  they were bought  and 
sold. 
29. I assume  that  households  have  incomes  equal  to one-third  of the house  price,  item- 
ize, and  have  nonhousing  itemized  deductions  equal  to the average  amount  for  other  item- 
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Table  3.  Statistics  on Repeat  Sales, Selected  Cities, 1970-82 
Statistic  Atlanta  Chicago  Dallas  Oakland 
Sample  size  475  875  259  126 
Annual  real appreciation 
(percent)  -  1.5  1.4  1.8  6.0 
Price statistics (thousands 
of 1990  dollars) 
Bottom-quartile  cutoff  44.0  63.0  40.3  80.9 
Median  62.8  82.8  56.2  97.3 
Top-quartile  cutoff  83.3  103.7  76.1  121.9 
Marginal  tax rates (percent) 
Bottom-quartile  cutoff 
1973  15  19  14  19 
1980  14  18  14  21 
Top-quartile  cutoff 
1973  19  22  19  22 
1980  21  24  21  32 
Top-octile  cutoff 
1973  22  22  19  22 
1980  24  32  24  32 
Source: Author's  tabulations  using  data  provided  by Karl  Case. The sample  includes  all houses in the Case and 
Shiller  (1987)  data  set that  sold  once between  January  1970  and  December  1973  and  then  again  between  January  1979 
and December  1982.  Marginal  tax rate estimates  assume  that  the homeowner  has an adjusted  gross income  of one- 
third  of the house  price, is married  with two children,  files a joint tax return,  and claims  itemized  deductions  equal 
to the average  for other  households  in the income  class. 
ginal  tax rate 10  or more  percentage  points  higher  than  the start-up  buyer 
in 1980.  These tax rate differentials  translate  into larger  effects of rising 
inflation  rates and nominal  interest rates for the trade-up  than for the 
starter-home  buyer. 
Table 4 reports the differential  appreciation  of houses in different 
quartiles  of the price  distribution.  In each city, houses in the top quartile 
appreciated  faster  than  houses in the bottom  quartile;  the differences  are 
statistically significant  in three of the four cities.  On average, top- 
quartile  homes appreciated  between 1 and 2 percent a year faster than 
bottom-quartile  homes. The middle  panel of table 4 reports  analogous 
evidence for the difference  in appreciation  rates between homes in the 
top octile of the price distribution  and those in the bottom  quartile.  The 
appreciation  differences  are larger  than those between the top and bot- 
tom quartiles. 
The final  panel of table  4 presents  a more specific  test of whether  the 
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Table 4.  Relative Changes in House Prices, Selected Cities over the 1970s 
Regression result  Atlanta  Chicago  Dallas  Oakland 
Without  inflation  interactionsa 
Quartile  regressions 
Constant  -  1.52  1.60  1.69  5.85 
(0.16)  (0.13)  (0.21)  (0.32) 
Differential  appreciation  (ye)  0.78  2.01  2.82  1.27 
(0.33)  (0.25)  (0.42)  (0.65) 
R  2  0.01  0.07  0.15  0.03 
Sample  size  475  875  259  126 
Octile regressions 
Constant  -  1.52  1.60  1.87  6.06 
(0.15)  (0.  11)  (0.19)  (2.89) 
Differential  appreciation  (y,)  1.28  2.54  3.45  1.03 
(0.40)  (0.31)  (0.52)  (0.81) 
R  2  0.02  0.08  0.15  0.02 
Sample  size  475  875  259  126 
With  inflation  interactionsa 
Constant  -0.50  1.48  2.99  6.65 
(0.08)  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.12) 
Differential  appreciation  (yl)  0.71  -0.27  -0.33  -3.00 
(0.20)  (0.21)  (0.34)  (0.31) 
Differential  with interaction  (y3)  22.13  33.78  81.60  191.42 
(5.74)  (8.05)  (10.57)  (12.01) 
R  2  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.06 
Sample  size  7,457  12,584  5,501  6,663 
Source: Author's  calculations.  The quartile  and  octile regressions  include  all houses  in the Case  and  Shiller  (1987) 
data  set that  sold  once between  January  1970  and  December  1973  and  then  again  between  January  1979  and  December 
1982.  The sample  for the inflation-interaction  regressions  includes  all  houses  from  the Case-Shiller  data  set, regardless 
of the date of sale, provided  the first  and second  sales were separated  by more  than  four  quarters.  Equation  7 in the 
text shows the basic  form  of the regression. 
a. The regression  without  inflation  interactions  excludes  the two interactive  terms  in equation  7 from  the analysis. 
The regression  with  inflation  interactions  is for quartiles  only. 
tial appreciation  rates. This panel reports estimates of a regression 
equation, 
(7)  Ri =  yo +  yI IQli  +  Y2(IQli + IQ4i) +  y3IQ1iA7iT 
?  y4(IQ1i  +  IQ4i)A1i  +  Ei, 
where IQli  (IQ4j) is a dummy  variable  indicating  that house i is in the 
first  (fourth)  quartile  of the price distribution.  The variable  AU\  denotes 
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sale date for house i. This variable is interacted with each quartile 
dummy  variable  to explore  possible differences  in the effect of expected 
inflation  on starter  and  trade-up  houses. Testing  whether  y3 differs  from 
zero amounts  to testing  whether  the difference  between the relative  ap- 
preciation  rates of high- and low-value homes depends on the amount 
by which the expected inflation  rate has changed  between the dates of 
purchase  and sale.30  A positive value  for Y3  corresponds  to greater  price 
increases for expensive than for less expensive homes during  periods 
when the expected inflation  rate increased.  The expected inflation  rate 
is measured  using the median  one-year  expected inflation  rate reported 
in the American  Statistical  Association-National Bureau  of Economic 
Research  survey of economic  forecasters.31 
Equation  7 is estimated  using  all of the repeat  sales in the Case-Shiller 
data  base, not  just those with  particular  first-  and  second-sale  dates. The 
results  are consistent  with  the view that  rising  inflation  rates  were an im- 
portant  factor in the disparate  appreciation  of starter  versus trade-up 
homes during  the 1970s  and  early 1980s.  In all  four  cities the null  hypoth- 
esis of Y3  = 0 can be rejected  at very high confidence  levels. The esti- 
mates of ry, the systematic  difference  in appreciation  rates between the 
two quartiles, decline for all four cities relative to the differences re- 
ported in the upper  panel of table 4. The point estimates suggest large 
effects of the expected inflation  rate on relative appreciation  rates. In 
Chicago, for example, the estimates suggest that a 1 percentage  point 
rise in the expected inflation  rate  during  the holding  period  generates  an 
appreciation  rate  of top-quartile  homes that is 0.3 percent  a year  greater 
than  that  for less expensive homes.32 
I explored  the sensitivity  of the findings  with  respect  to my procedure 
for classifying  houses into the top and bottom quartiles.  If houses are 
classified  on the basis of their  price at the first  transaction,  the findings 
on differences  in interquartile  appreciation  rates, as in the upper  panels 
30. I include  the  variables  IQli and  (IQli + IQ4,)  in the  regression,  rather  than  IQli and 
IQ4i  separately,  because  the  coefficient  on IQli in my specification  estimates  the  difference 
between  the coefficients  on IQIi  and  IQ4i  if the variables  are  included  separately. 
31. I am  grateful  to Wayne  Gray  for help  in accessing  these data. 
32. The  focus on annual  appreciation  rates  in this calculation  is somewhat  inappropri- 
ate, although  it permits  comparability  with earlier  results.  Theory  suggests  that  a shift  to 
a higher  inflation  rate  should  result  in a one-time  increase  in house  prices,  not a long  period 
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of table 4, are much weaker than the results based on average price 
ranks.33  The results  on the interaction  between inflation  and  the quartile 
rank,  as in the lower panel  of table  4, are virtually  unchanged.  These re- 
sults, as well as those with the Census Bureau  hedonic  models, are con- 
sistent with the predictions  of the after-tax  user cost analysis. 
Three alternative  explanations  of the relative patterns  of large- and 
small-house  price appreciation  deserve comment. The first  is that wid- 
ening  income inequality,  with a greater  share  of buying  power accruing 
to high-income  households, has generated  demand  pressures  similar  to 
those implied by the after-tax user cost analysis. Between 1972 and 
1980,  the real pretax  income of a family at the 25th  percentile  of the in- 
come distribution  declined  by 2 percent,  real  income  for the median  fam- 
ily rose 2 percent, and real income at the 75th percentile  increased  4.3 
percent.34  After-tax  income is likely to track  pretax  income reasonably 
well during  this period. Assuming  that housing  demand  has an income 
elasticity of one and that the buyer  of a start-up  home falls between the 
25th and 50th percentiles  of the income distribution,  the widening  dis- 
parity  in incomes could explain  between a 4 and 6 percent  appreciation 
of larger  homes relative  to smaller  ones. The estimated  effects reported 
above are substantially  larger  than  this. 
A second possibility  is that high  nominal  interest  rates  from  the mid- 
1970s  until  the mid-1980s  lowered housing  demand,  particularly  among 
young households. Most lenders  apply simple  rules in approving  mort- 
gages, lending  only up to the point  where  interest  payments  equal  a fixed 
fraction  of the household's income. High nominal  interest rates there- 
fore reduce  the amount  that  any household  can borrow,  potentially  low- 
ering housing demand.35  Since small houses are more typically pur- 
chased  by first-time  buyers,  who tend  to have higher  loan-to-value  ratios 
than  repeat  buyers, rising  nominal  rates  in the late 1970s  could have had 
a larger  negative  effect on the prices of smaller  houses. 
A final  alternative  explanation  is that  the rise in real  house prices  dur- 
ing  the 1970s  reflected  the introduction  of growth  controls  in many  local- 
ities.36  If growth  controls  were more  stringent  in communities  with more 
33. Rankings  based  on initial  price  induce  a downward  bias  in the appreciation  rate  of 
high-value  houses, so the weaker  results  in this  case are  not surprising. 
34. See Karoly  (1990). 
35. See Schwab  (1983). 
36. Katz  and  Rosen  (1987)  present  empirical  evidence  on the importance  of this  effect 
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expensive homes, then the observed  pattern  could be the result  of these 
changes. This explanation  does not, however, account  for the differen- 
tial  appreciation  patterns  during  the 1980s.  All of these competing  expla- 
nations  deserve further  empirical  analysis. 
Explaining Price Changes in Different Cities 
The substantial  differences in the appreciation  rates of real house 
prices  across  cities suggest  the possibility  of using  city-level  data  to eval- 
uate alternative  explanations  for house price movements. This section 
analyzes  how changes  in demography,  construction  costs, incomes, and 
tax rates correlate  with changes  in city-level house prices over time.37 
The reduced-form  cross-section model that underlies  the empirical 
work  is 
(8)  APit  -0  +  81ACit  +  82Adit +  83AYit  +  84Aui, + vit, 
where  pit  is the logarithm  of the real  median  house price  in city i at period 
t, cit  denotes the logarithm  of real  construction  costs, di,  is the logarithm 
of a demand  measure  based on population  structure,  yit  is the logarithm 
of real per capita income, ui, is an indicator  of real user costs of home- 
ownership, and vi, are residuals. 
Data on per capita income are available  from the Census Bureau  at 
the SMSA level each year. I measure  residential  construction  costs in 
each city with R. S. Means' city-specific  cost indexes.38  These indexes 
are used by project  planners  to evaluate  the cost of building  projects  in 
many  different  cities. Means  computes  both a residential  and  a nonresi- 
dential  cost index for each city. The indexes reflect  labor  and materials 
costs of construction.  Unfortunately,  the residential  cost index is only 
available  since 1987.  I therefore  use the nonresidential  cost index, which 
is available  for the entire  1980-90  period.  In the years  when  both  indexes 
are available,  their  correlation  across cities is 0.96. 
37. Some  earlier  work,  notably  that  by Ozanne  and  Thibodeau  (1983)  and  Black  (1990), 
has tried  to explain  the levels of house or land prices across cities. Gyourko  and Voith 
(1991)  analyze  the heterogeneity  in price  appreciation  across housing  markets  in a larger 
data  set, but  the  data  they  use are  largely  the  result  of interpolating  cross-sectional  patterns 
from  census years  using  a few time  series  between  censuses. 
38. Means Constr  uction Cost Data is published  annually  by R. S. Means  Company  of 
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The demographic  demand  variable  (di,) captures  the changes  in hous- 
ing  demand  that  occur  as the age composition  of the population  changes. 
The index used by Mankiw and Weil is d, =  log(l  Na,Da), where N  at is 
the number  of individuals  of age a alive in year t, and  Da is the average 
housing  demand  of persons in age group  a as estimated  from  the decen- 
nial census data. To construct  the analogue  to this variable  at the city 
level ideally  requires  information  on both  the number  of persons  of each 
age and  the age-specific  housing  demand  pattern  in each SMSA. The de- 
mand  pattern  is the result of tenure  choice, household  formation  deci- 
sions, and decisions about how much housing  to purchase  conditional 
on tenure. All of these decisions are affected by the level of house 
prices.39  To avoid the obvious endogeneity, I use national  indexes of 
age-specific  housing  demand  to compute  di,.'0 
Information  on the number  of persons  of different  ages in each SMSA 
was calculated  from the March  Current  Population  Surveys (CPS) for 
1979, 1980, and 1981.41  The CPS indicates a respondent's SMSA for 
those who live in large  urban  areas. Eleven of the SMSAs in the sample 
are  not separately  identified  in CPS  records  at the beginning  of the 1980s; 
for these cities, I estimate state-specific  values and apply them to the 
cities. 
Since migration  decisions are  affected  by housing  costs, the age com- 
position of people in a city may be a function of house prices. Rather 
than  relating  the actual  change  in house prices between two years to the 
actual  change  in the demographic  demand  index, I therefore  predict  the 
change  in the demographic  index based on prevailing  mortality  rates in 
1980.  For example, a city with relatively  more inhabitants  between the 
ages of 10  and  20 in 1980  would be predicted  to exhibit  a relatively  large 
change in its demographic  housing  demand  as these individuals  passed 
into their  prime  homebuying  years during  the subsequent  decade. This 
predictable  demand  variation  should  have no effect on prices under  the 
rational-expectations  hypothesis. 
The final variable is a measure of the user cost of housing facing 
homebuyers  in different  cities. Many components  of the user cost, in- 
cluding  the nominal  interest  rate and the expected inflation  rate, do not 
39. See Smith,  Rosen, and Fallis (1988).  Hendershott  (1988b)  presents  empirical  evi- 
dence on how household  formation  decisions  depend  on real  house  prices  and  rents. 
40. The national  weights  are  drawn  from  Mankiw  and  Weil  (1989). 
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vary much  across cities although  they do vary over time. Since many  of 
my estimating  equations  include  year  effects, it is not possible  to analyze 
how these factors affect house prices within  this data set. One compo- 
nent  that  does vary  across cities is the federal  marginal  tax rate  at which 
households can deduct mortgage  interest and property  taxes. The tax 
rate  varies  across cities because of differences  in income  and  in state tax 
provisions  that affect the chances of a given household  itemizing.  I ex- 
plore two variables  to proxy this user cost variation:  the average mar- 
ginal  federal  income  tax rate  at which  interest  would  be deducted  by res- 
idents of the city and the fraction  of households  in the city who itemize 
deductions  on their  federal  tax returns.42 
Table 5 presents the results of estimating  equation  8 for the 39 cities 
in the NAR data base with 10 years of data.43  The results suggest that 
shifts  in income  and  in construction  costs have important  effects on real 
house prices but provide little support for the importance  of demo- 
graphic  factors  or after-tax  user costs. The first  column  shows the result 
of including  only changes in per capita income and the demographic 
variable  in the equation.  The estimates  imply  a substantial  effect of real 
income growth  on house prices, with an apparent  income elasticity of 
two. The demography  variable,  which should  have a positive coefficient 
on the view that house prices rise when the demographic  mix shifts to- 
ward homeownership,  actually has a negative (but statistically insig- 
nificant)  estimated  effect. 
The second column in table 5 augments  the first  equation  by adding 
the percentage  change in construction  costs to the set of explanatory 
variables.  A 1  percent  rise in real  construction  costs is associated  with a 
0.97 percent  rise in real median  house prices. If construction  costs are 
disaggregated  into materials  and installation  cost (these results are not 
shown in the table), the installation-cost  coefficient remains close to 
unity while the coefficient  on materials  is positive but statistically  insig- 
42. House prices  can affect  the fraction  of taxpayers  who itemize.  If house prices  are 
low, more  households  will  own their  homes,  have  mortgage  interest  deductions,  aud  there- 
fore itemize. I therefore  treat the tax variables  as endogenous  and instrument  for them 
using  average  state income  tax collections  per  capita.  The  latter  variable  affects  the proba- 
bility  of itemizing  but  should  not be affected  by housing  demand. 
43. A longer  time series of house prices  for some cities is available  from  the Federal 
Home  Loan  Bank  Board,  which  tabulates  the characteristics  (including  house  price)  from 
a small  sample  of new loans in some cities. These data  seem much  noisier  than  the NAR 
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Table  5. Explaining  Changes  in City-Specific  House  Prices  between  1980  and 1989 
Specification 
Independent  variable  5.1  5.2  5.3  5.4  5.5 
Constant  -0.143  -0.066  -0.083  -0.287  -0.068 
(0.136)  (0.144)  (0.121)  (0.188)  (0.100) 
Income per capita  2.054  1.740  1.795  2.079  1.327 
(0.349)  (0.297)  (0.325)  (0.368)  (0.297) 
Construction costs  ...  0.973  0.960  0.966  0.963 
(0.229)  (0.261)  (0.229)  (0.200) 
Demographic  demand  -0.958  -0.743  -0.648  -0.686  -0.056 
(0.869)  (0.718)  (0.773)  (0.722)  (0.652) 
Percent who itemize  ...  ...  0.001  ...  ... 
(0.014) 
Average  marginal 
federal tax rate  ...  ...  ...  -0.057  ... 
(0.042) 
Farm land price  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.208 
(0.058) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.546  0.699  0.705  0.721  0.787 
Source:  Author's  calculations.  The sample includes  39 cities  with data from  1980-89 in the NAR  data base.  Data 
on the percent who itemized and average marginal federal tax rates are from the NBER TAXSIM model.  Land prices 
are from the  USDA  Faritn  Market Real  Estate  Developmenits.  Other data are described  in the text.  The  estimates 
shown  give  the  coefficients  of  an  OLS  regression  of  the  percentage  change  in city-specific  house  prices  on  the 
percentage change of the real independent  variables shown.  Percentage  changes  for all variables except  the percent 
who itemized and the average marginal tax rate are measured by the change in logs. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
nificant.  This suggests a strong  association between changes in house 
prices and changes in construction  wages. The direction  of causality  in 
this relationship  requires  further  exploration. 
The third  column in the table includes the change in the fraction  of 
taxpayers  itemizing  in the state. The estimated  effect is near zero. The 
results are similar  when the fraction of taxpayers who itemize in the 
state  where  the SMSA  is located  is included  as a regressor.  The ordinary 
least squares  results in table 5 are very similar  to the results when the 
tax variables  were treated  as endogenous. 
The last column  in table 5 adds the percentage  change  in real  agricul- 
tural  land prices, measured  as the change in the USDA's state-specific 
land price index, to the estimating  equation. The results suggest that 
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Table  6. Instrumental  Variable  Estimates  of Changes  in House  Prices, 1980-89 
Specification 
Independent  variable  6.1  6.2  6.3 
Constant  -0.521  - 0.338  - 0.285 
(0.233)  (0.203)  (0.185) 
Income per capita  3.513  2.793  2.352 
(0.774)  (0.697)  (0.761) 
Construction  costs  .  .  .  0.757  0.795 
(0.291)  (0.258) 
Demographic  demand  0.237  0.018  0.245 
(1.161)  (0.930)  (0.787) 
Real farm  land prices  ...  ...  0.119 
(0.090) 
Source:  See table 5. In these regressions,  the change in real per capita income is treated as endogenous;  the change 
in the city's  real per capita income  over  the  previous  decade  and the contemporaneous  change  in real per capita 
federal procurement outlays  are used as instrumental variables. 
change in the median  house price but that controlling  for this variable 
has relatively  little effect on the other  estimated  coefficients. 
If house prices  rise in a city, existing  homeowners  may increase  their 
consumption  and builders  may start more new houses. Both develop- 
ments contribute  to a larger  increase in the city's per capita income, 
making  income  and  real  house prices simultaneously  determined.  Table 
6 reestimates  several equations  from table 5 but now treats the change 
in real income as endogenous  and uses lagged  changes in per capita in- 
come and the contemporaneous  change in real per capita federal pro- 
curement  awards  as instrumental  variables.  The results  are not substan- 
tially different  from  those in table 5. The estimated  effect of changes in 
income on house prices is larger  in table 6, but the coefficients  on con- 
struction  costs and the demographic  variable  are not affected by this 
change  in specification. 
The results in this section suggest that changes in real income and 
construction  costs are important  explanators  of the cross-city  pattern  of 
house price appreciation,  but they do not suggest a central  role for pre- 
dictable changes in the demographic  composition of the city. These 
findings  suggest caution in evaluating  long-term  house price forecasts 
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Are House Prices Forward Looking? 
Local housing booms are one of the principal  challenges to under- 
standing  house price dynamics. Table 7 presents the extreme values 
from the distribution  of nominal  house price appreciation  in the NAR 
data  set. There  are 26 city-years  with nominal  appreciation  of more  than 
20 percent in the 1980-90  period, with the 38.6 percent appreciation  in 
Providence  in 1987  being the single sharpest  price change. By contrast, 
there is only one city-year,  Houston in 1986,  in which the median  nomi- 
nal price fell by more  than 10  percent, and only 15  cases of more  than  5 
percent  nominal  declines. 
House price  booms in a single  city are virtually  impossible  to explain 
on the basis of shifts  in real  user costs, since most of the factors  affecting 
the user  cost are  determined  nationally.  Explanations  must  therefore  fo- 
cus on shifts in the local demand  for housing,  driven  either  by expecta- 
tions of future income growth, population  growth, or rising costs of 
building  or acquiring  land. Price  bubbles  are another  possibility. 
One explanation  for large  short-term  shifts  in city real  estate markets 
involves changing  expectations  of economic  growth.  With  a fixed  supply 
of land, rising  growth  expectations  would raise land values and median 
house prices.44  The time series behavior  of city income is central  to this 
argument.  If shocks to income growth rates persist, shifting  expecta- 
tions of income  growth  could account  for some of the rapid  increases  in 
house prices. To test this view, I estimate 
(9)  AYit=  Oi +  PIAYi,t-I  +  2'Yi,t-2  +  Eit, 
where lyit corresponds  either to the change  in the logarithm  of real per 
capita  income or to the change  in the level of the unemployment  rate.45 
The results of estimating  equation  9, with and without  year and city 
effects in place of the constant, are shown in table  8. Innovations  in real 
income  growth  rates  persist, with next year's growth  increment  roughly 
half the size of the current  year's. When economywide factors are re- 
44. How changing  growth  expectations  would affect the value of housing  structures 
alone  is a more  complex  issue, hinging  on the speed  at which  new construction  rises. 
45. Earlier  versions of this paper  also included  lags of the level of yi, to explore the 
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Table 7.  House Price Booms and Busts, by City or Region, 1980-90 
Percent 
Percent change 
City  or region  Year  Nominal Real 
Providence,  RI  1987  38.6  33.7 
Boston,  MA  1985  34.2  29.6 
Honolulu,  HI  1990  30.4  23.7 
Providence,  RI  1986  29.8  27.4 
Hartford,  CT  1986  29.5  27.2 
Honolulu,  HI  1989  28.6  22.7 
Atlanta,  GA  1980  27.7  12.5 
New York City, NY  1985  27.3  22.9 
Kansas City, MO  1982  26.0  18.7 
Orange  County, CA  1988  23.1  18.2 
Seattle, WA  1990  23.5  17.1 
San Francisco,  CA  1980  23.1  8.5 
Aurora/Elgin,  IL  1989  22.8  17.2 
San Francisco,  CA  1989  22.5  16.8 
Seattle, WA  1989  22.3  16.7 
Sacramento,  CA  1990  22.3  16.0 
Hartford,  CT  1987  22.0  17.7 
Los Angeles, CA  1988  21.6  16.8 
Aurora/Elgin,  IL  1990  21.5  15.3 
Boston, MA  1984  21.1  16.1 
Albany, NY  1986  20.6  18.4 
Fort Lauderdale,  FL  1980  20.6  6.3 
San Francisco,  CA  1988  20.4  15.6 
Orange  County, CA  1989  20.3  14.8 
Los Angeles, CA  1989  20.1  14.5 
Springfield,  IL  1987  20.1  15.9 
Houston, TX  1986  -  11.1  -  12.7 
Oklahoma  City, OK  1988  -9.8  -  13.4 
Bergen/Passaic,  NJ  1990  - 8.2  -  12.9 
Denver, CO  1988  -8.0  -11.6 
San Antonio, TX  1988  -7.4  -11.1 
Nassau/Suffolk,  NY  1990  -6.4  -  11.2 
New Haven, CT  1990  -6.2  -11.0 
Houston, TX  1988  -6.2  -9.9 
Monmouth/Ocean  City, NJ  1990  -5.9  -10.7 
Charleston,  WV  1990  -5.9  -10.7 
Houston, TX  1987  - 5.7  -9.0 
Dallas, TX  1988  - 5.5  -9.3 
Hartford,  CT  1990  - 5.2  -  10.0 
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Table 8.  Persistence of Shocks to Real Activity 
Dependent  variable 
Independent  Change  in the log  Change  in the 
variable  of income  per capita  unemployment  rate 
Constant  0.014  ...  ..  -0.042  ...  ... 
(0.001)  (0.056) 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
One lag  0.462  0.355  0.393  0.242  0.098  -0.034 
(0.033)  (0.036)  (0.095)  (0.045)  (0.050)  (0.091) 
Two  lags  -0.265  -0.045  -0.148  -0.172  0.013  -0.065 
(0.033)  (0.035)  (0.051)  (0.045)  (0.050)  (0.066) 
Fired effects 
Cities  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Years  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Estimation  method  OLS  OLS  IV  OLS  OLS  IV 
R  2  0.201  0.685  ...  0.073  0.613  ... 
Source:  Author's calculations.  All estimates  for per capita income  use data for 21 years (1970-90)  for the same 39 
cities  used  throughout the paper (N  =  819).  The data samples  for the unemployment  rate are shorter, yielding 458 
observations.  The  equations  denoted  IV  estimation  are  estimated  by  differencing  the  specification,  rather than 
including city  intercepts,  and using further lagged values  of  the lagged dependent  variables as  instruments  for the 
explanatory  variables.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
moved by including  year dummies, the estimated persistence declines 
substantially:  only about one-third  of a current  shock persists through 
the next period.46  These findings  make  it difficult  to argue  that  jumps in 
house prices reflect rational expectations of prolonged real income 
growth  in excess of the national  average.  The results  for the unemploy- 
ment  rate in table 8 confirm  the findings  for per capita  income. A 1 per- 
centage point decline in the unemployment  rate in one year is followed 
by at most a 0.24 percentage  point decline in the next year. 
Even if rapid  house price increases  are difficult  to  justify on the basis 
of future  income expectations, it does not follow that house prices are 
completely uninformative  about future income prospects for a metro- 
politan  area. Anecdotal  evidence suggests  that  house prices are  forward 
looking  to some degree. There is evidence that relative house prices in 
California  adjusted  to the permanent  change in tax liabilities  following 
46. The equations  in the second and fifth  columns  of table 8 estimate  city effects by 
adding  a set of city-specific  intercepts  to the estimating  equation.  This approach  yields 
inconsistent  estimates  in models  with  lagged  dependent  variables;  see Keane  and  Runkle 
(1991).  The estimates  in the third  and sixth columns  allow for city effects by differencing 
equation  9 and  using  further  lagged  values  of the right-hand-side  variables  as instruments. 
This yields  consistent  estimates. James M. Poterba  173 
Table 9.  Forecast Power of House Price Changes for Real Activity 
Dependent  variable 
Independent  Change  in the log  Change  in the 
variable  of income  per capita  unemployment  rate 
Constant  0.012  ...  ...  -0.100  ... 
(0.001)  (0.061) 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
One lag  0.470  0.483  0.385  0.204  0.078  0.053 
(0.044)  (0.047)  (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.051)  (0.053) 
Two lags  -0.162  -0.065  -0.134  -0.161  0.009  -0.013 
(0.042)  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.051)  (0.054) 
Lagged  change  in 
house prices  0.040  0.020  0.016  -2.508  0.528  0.891 
(0.018)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (1.067)  (0.793)  (0.853) 
Fixed effects 
Cities  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Years  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
R  2  0.233  0.689  0.723  0.073  0.613  0.629 
Source: Author's  calculations  using  data  from  a panel  of 39 cities with  NAR median  house prices  for 1980-89,  for 
the 1965-89  period  for real  per capita  income,  and 1970-89  for unernployment  rates.  The sample  for the per capita 
income regressions  includes 464 observations,  and that for the unemployment  rate regressions  includes 392 
observations.  Standard  errors  are in parentheses. 
Proposition  13,  discounting  future  tax saving  at an annual  rate  of approx- 
imately  7 percent. Within  a week of the recent selection of Berlin  as the 
new German  capital, for example, realtors  estimated  that house prices 
had  increased  5 percent.47 
The informational  content of house prices can be tested by analyzing 
their predictive power in autoregressions  for real per capita income 
changes  in a metropolitan  area.48  When  equation  9 is estimated  with  time 
effects, the analysis focuses only on the house price variation  in each 
city relative  to the national  average.  Allowing  for city effects as well re- 
moves the explanatory  power resulting  from  differences  in the average 
rates  of house price  appreciation  and  the average  rates  of income  growth 
across cities.49 
Table 9 presents evidence on the forecast power of housing capital 
gains. The data  sample  is the set of 39 NAR cities with complete  median 
47. See Rosen  (1982)  and "The  Vote for Berlin,"  Christian  Science  Monitor,  June  26, 
1991,  p. 20, respectively. 
48. This is analogous  to testing  the role of the stock market  in forecasting  aggregate 
output  fluctuations;  for  example,  see Fischer  and  Merton  (1984)  or Barro  (1990). 
49. Models  with  city effects are  estimated  by differencing  and  using  further  lags  of the 
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house price histories between 1980  and 1989. The results suggest that 
the change  in house prices during  the previous  year has significant  fore- 
casting  power  for next year's change  in per capita  income. A 10  percent 
rise in house prices forecasts a rise of 0.40 percent  in the next year's in- 
come growth  rate. The estimated  effect declines slightly  when year and 
city effects are added to the specification.  For the unemployment  rate 
equations,  a 10  percent  house  price  rise  forecasts  a 0.25 percentage  point 
decline in the next year's unemployment  rate. 
The finding  that house prices have some predictive  power supports 
the notion that house prices are forward  looking. One might also ask, 
however, whether they contain information  not found in other asset 
prices. At the national  level, the level of the stock market  would be the 
obvious comparison  asset. Unfortunately,  there are no stock price in- 
dexes for the economies of particular  cities. I therefore constructed 
pseudo-indexes using industry-level  stock returns  from Standard  and 
Poor's (S&P)  along  with city-specific  employment  data.50  The index for 
city i in year  t is Ii, =  E eij Ij,  where  eij is the share  of employment  in city 
i in sectorj in a base year (in  this case 1986)  and  Ij, is the S&P  price  index 
for industryj  at time t. I exclude all agricultural  employees from  the cal- 
culation  and  assign  the total  market  return  to any industries  not included 
in an explicit S&P  category  (government,  for example).5' 
Table 10 shows the results of including  the city-specific  stock return 
in regression  equations  for future  changes in per capita  income and the 
unemployment  rate. Changes in the city-specific stock market index 
have substantial  predictive  power for future  income growth,  even after 
controlling  for the level of house prices. The lagged house price return 
remains  positive and statistically  significant  in some equations,  even af- 
ter including  the lagged stock return  measure. The coefficient on the 
lagged house price change is virtually  the same in equations  with and 
without  the change  in the stock price. 
Changes  in the city-specific stock return  predict substantively  large 
50. I am  grateful  to David  Cutler  for providing  much  of the data  that  was used for this 
calculation. 
51. There  are many  reasons  to suspect  that  the growth  rate  of the government  sector 
differs  from that of the economy as a whole. The treatment  of the government  sector is 
most important  in Washington,  where 34.4 percent  of employment  is in non-S&P  indus- 
tries, Sacramento  (26.9 percent),  and Albany  (23.3 percent).  The average  share  of non- 
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Table 10.  Relative Forecast Power of House Prices and Stock Prices 
Dependent  variable 
Independent  Change  in the log  Change  in the 
variable  of income  per capita  unemployment  rate 
Constant  0.012  ...  ...  -0.108  ... 
(0.001)  (0.061) 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
One lag  0.441  0.464  0.368  0.192  0.061  0.036 
(0.044)  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.053) 
Two lags  -0.151  -0.060  -0.129  -0.158  0.010  -0.010 
(0.041)  (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.050)  (0.053) 
Lagged change in  0.047  0.024  0.019  -2.649  0.402  0.731 
house  price  (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (1.058)  (0.733)  (0.838) 
Lagged change in  0.296  0.169  0.177  -14.025  -12.749  -13.375 
stock return  (0.077)  (0.051)  (0.053)  (4.806)  (3.167)  (3.477) 
Fixed effects 
Cities  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Years  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
R  2  0.257  0.696  0.730  0.092  0.629  0.644 
Source:  See table 9. These regressions also include the lagged city-specific  stock return as an independent variable. 
movements  in house prices. The estimates in the second and fifth col- 
umns of table 10 imply that a 10 percent increase in the city-specific 
stock index relative to the national index forecasts a 1.7 percentage 
point increase in the SMSA's per capita income growth  rate and a 1.3 
percentage  point reduction  in the SMSA unemployment  rate, respec- 
tively. 
City-level data provide more variation  in house prices and subse- 
quent income movements than national  data, but equations similar  to 
those reported  above can also be estimated  for the United States as a 
whole. With  annual  data,  the change  in real  GNP, A  ln GNPt,  in two con- 
secutive years can be regressed on the lagged changes in real house 
prices, A ln PH, t-  (measured in the fourth quarter of the year), and the 
real value of the stock market,  A ln PM  t- I (the lagged  end-of-year  value 
of the S&P  500). Results  for the 1965-89  period  are shown  in the follow- 
ing equation: 
(10)  A  ln GNPt =  0.026  +  0.220 A ln PH,t- 
(0.004)  (0.130) 
+  0.085  A ln PM,t 1. 
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Increases in house prices signal a future increase in GNP, even after 
controlling  for real stock market  changes. If this equation  is estimated 
without the lagged stock-market-return  variable, the coefficient on 
changes  in house prices is smaller  (0.157). 
Are House Price Movements Forecastable? 
The foregoing  results  suggest  that  house prices  forecast  real  activity. 
A more traditional  question  in financial  economics is whether  asset re- 
turns-for example, the returns  to owning  a home-can  be forecast us- 
ing lagged  information.  If house prices always incorporate  all available 
information,  it should  not be possible to predict  the future  trajectory  of 
these prices using  lagged  information.  The set of potential  predictors  is 
large, and I focus on a relatively  small set of lagged variables:  changes 
in  real  house prices  themselves  and  changes  in SMSA  per  capita  income. 
A number  of recent studies suggest  that  changes  in house prices may 
be predictable.52  To explore this issue with the NAR median  price data 
set, I estimate 
(11)  (pit  -  rd) =  a  +  P(Api,t-  -rt-r)  +  I2AYi,t-I  +  Eit, 
where rt  is the return  on 90-day  Treasury  bills. The dependent  variable 
is the excess return  on houses. Table 11 shows the estimation  results. 
The findings  confirm  earlier  evidence that house price movements are 
predictable  on the basis of lagged  information.  Both lagged  house price 
appreciation  and the lagged change in real per capita income in the 
SMSA help  forecast  future  price  movements.  The results  imply  positive 
serial  correlation  in excess returns  in local housing  markets  at the one- 
year horizon.53 
There is no evidence that house prices revert toward  some common 
mean  in the long run. Figure  4 addresses  this issue by plotting  the house 
52. See Case and Shiller  (1989)  and Cutler,  Poterba,  and Summers  (1991).  Case and 
Shiller  (1990)  find  that lagged  changes  in real per capita  income, construction  costs, and 
house  prices  all forecast  future  excess returns  on houses. 
53. An earlier  draft  of this  paper,  available  from  the author,  also analyzed  the stochas- 
tic properties  of house  prices  between 1900  and 1934  using  a data  set collected  by the Civil 
Works  Administration  and reported  in the Bureau  of Foreign  and Domestic Commerce 
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Table 11.  Predictability of Excess Returns on Houses 
Specification 
Independent  variable  11.1  11.2  11.3  11.4 
Constant  -0.015  -0.026  .  .  . 
(0.003)  (0.003) 
Lagged  excess return 
on houses  0.503  0.450  0.499  0.506 
(0.039)  (0.037)  (0.124)  (0.126) 
Lagged  change  in real 
per capita income  .  .  .  0.668  .  .  .  -0.123 
(0.099)  (0.222) 
Fixed effects 
Cities  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Years  No  No  Yes  Yes 
R  2  0.255  0.317  . ..  .. 
Source:  Author's calculations  using a panel of 39 cities in the NAR data base with median house  price information 
for 1980-90. The basic estimating equation is 
(pir  -  r,)  =  a,i  +  I1  (Api,,t-  -  r,-1)  +  02AY40-I  +  Eir, 
where  the dependent  variable is the excess  return on houses,  measured  by the change  in house  prices  in city  i in 
year t minus the return on 90-day Treasury bills. Equations  11.3 and 11.4 are estimated by differencing and instrumental 
variables,  as suggested  by Anderson and Hsiao  (1981). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
price  rank  of each SMSA  in the NAR sample  in both 1980  and 1990.  Sev- 
eral cities-those  in California  and those in the Northeast-exhibited 
high  house prices  in 1980  and  again  in 1990.  One explanation  for this pat- 
tern  is that  cities differ  in their  median  incomes  and  that  high-income  cit- 
ies display high house prices. A plot of house-price-to-income  ratios, 
however, looks similar  to figure  4. 
The  findings  in table 11  confirm  earlier  findings  on the statistical  prop- 
erties of house prices. Richard  Meese and  Nancy Wallace,  for example, 
find important  evidence of positive serial correlation in house price 
movements in the San Francisco Bay area. Their study suggests that 
over long periods fundamentals-such as construction  cost, the user 
cost, and the income of potential  homeowners-tend  to explain house 
price  movements,  but  that  short-run  fluctuations  are  more  difficult  to ex- 
plain  on this basis.54  Analysis of the Boston house price increase in the 
mid-1980s  suggests a similar  conclusion: short-term  price movements 
seem to resemble  a price  bubble.55 
54. Meese and  Wallace  (1991). 
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Figure 4.  Cities Ranked by House Prices,  1980 Relative to 1990 
Rank in 1990 
40  * DES 
*ELP  *LOU 
35  -  0 TUL  ~~~~~~~~~~0 
SAA  35  *TUL  *~~~~~~~~~~~~AKR  GRA * 
*HU  SLC 
30  *HOU  *  TAM 
*IND  *KAN 
* STL  *DET 
25  -*MEM  *ROC 
OBIR  * Cos  SYR 
20  -  MIL  *NAS 
MIN  ABQ  *ATL 
15  -*FTL  OBAL  *ALB 
10  *~~0CHI  *PHI  10  WDC  *RIV  *PRO 
0 
5  _  M *HAR  SAD  BOS  *NYC 
0  *--LOS 
0 O*SAN  I  i  I  I  I  I  I 
0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35 
Rank  in 1980 
Source: Author's  calculation  from  NAR data. 
Do House Prices  Go Down? 
For the United States as a whole, real house prices have yet to experi- 
ence  any sharp decline.  Other countries,  however,  have experienced 
precipitous house price declines.  This section  exploits  data from three 
other nations-Canada,  the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands-to 
suggest that the U.S.  historical experience  may be somewhat unusual. 
Figure 5 presents  three decades  of real house  price movements  in 
Canada. The figure plots indexes  of constant-quality new-house  prices, 
excluding lot values,  computed by Statistics  Canada. The data suggest 
a strikingly different pattern of real house  price movements  than that 
found in the United States, with a rapid rise in the early 1970s followed 
by a deep decline that bottomed out about 1985. Between  the peak and 
trough of this cycle,  real house prices declined by more than 40 percent. 
The disparate experiences  of the United States and Canada are notable 
because  the  two  countries  exhibit  very  similar  demographic  struc- James M. Poterba  179 
Figure 5.  Real House Prices in Canada,  1950-89 
Index (1972  =  100) 
140 
130  - 
120- 





1950  1960  1970  1980 
Source:  Statistics  Canada. An index of real prices of constant-quality  new houses,  excluding  lot values,  is shown. 
Prices are deflated using Canadian CPI. 
tures.56 The movement of the baby-boom population into the peak 
homebuying  years does not seem to have triggered  a rapid  increase in 
house prices in Canada. 
The price movements in Vancouver  in the early 1980s  bear special 
comment.S7  House prices  in that  city rose more  than  60 percent  between 
late 1979  and early 1981  and then fell to approximately  their 1979  level 
by mid-1982.  The period of run-up  was one of high inflation  and high 
nominal  interest  rates, whereas the downturn  coincided  with the reces- 
56. Engelhardt  and  Poterba  (1991)  develop  this argument  in more  detail. 
57. Hamilton  and  Dale-Johnson  (1990)  create  repeat-sales  price  indexes  for houses in 
Vancouver;  their  data  are  the basis  for this  discussion. 180  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
Figure 6.  Average Real House Prices in the United Kingdom, 1970-91 
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Source:  Housing  and Construction  Statistics:  197949,  published by the British Central Statistical  Office (CSO). 
Earlier and later data are also from CSO. 
sion of 1982.  The pattern  of rapid  but  soon reversed  housing  capital  gains 
suggests  that  house prices can decline quickly  and  is reminiscent  of dis- 
cussions of asset-price  bubbles.58 
Figure 6 displays the pattern  of real house price movements in the 
United Kingdom  for the past two decades. There are three episodes of 
house price  increases  followed by sharp  declines: one in the mid-1970s, 
one in the early 1980s,  and most recently  one in the late 1980s  and early 
1990s.  The recent decline has been particularly  severe in some regions, 
with a nominal  house price decline in the Southeast  of 20 percent since 
the end of 1988. For the entire United Kingdom, nominal  prices have 
been constant since 1988.  They have fallen by 12 percent  in real terms 
during  the same  period.59 
58. See Kindleberger  (1978). 
59. The  Economnist,  August  17, 1991,  p. 51, presents  more  detail  on the circumstances 
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Figure 7.  Real House Prices in the Netherlands, 1965-85 
Index, 1970 = 100 
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Source:  Maanidstatistiek Bouw,iijverheid, December  1983, table 14.2H, and June 1986, table 14.13H. See Holmans 
(1989, p. 212). 
The earlier  real price declines are even sharper.  The price "bubble" 
of the mid-1970s  included  a 60 percent real increase in prices between 
1971  and 1973,  followed by a 30 percent real (but not nominal)  decline 
by 1977.  This  price  increase  and  decrease  is at least partly  attributable  to 
changes  in the availability  of mortgage  funds  and  to slowing  real  income 
growth.60  The real  price decline between 1980  and 1982  was 18  percent, 
in this case partly  sparked  by rising  interest  rates and  a credit  crunch. 
The Netherlands  provides  a further  example  of a rapid  rise, and then 
decline,  in house prices. Figure  7 shows that  between 1972  and 1976,  real 
60. See Holmans  (1989)  and  Muellbauer  (1989). 182  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
house prices rose nearly 30 percent. They increased sharply,  by more 
than 30 percent  again, between 1976  and 1978  only to fall by nearly 50 
percent,  back to their 1972  levels, by 1981. 
A detailed  event study of each of these national  markets  would be a 
worthy  topic of future  research.  The broad  pattern  of price  increase  and 
decrease  suggests,  however, that  real  house prices  can be quite  unstable 
even over relatively  short  time horizons. 
Conclusions 
This  paper  has presented  a variety  of new results  on the determinants 
of house prices. For the 1970s,  the results  on relative  house price  appre- 
ciation, as well as on the broad  movements  in house prices, are consis- 
tent with the real  user cost analysis  of the owner-occupied  housing  mar- 
ket. This analysis stresses the interaction  of high inflation  rates with an 
income tax code that allowed households to deduct nominal interest 
payments, which can result in negative real after-tax  borrowing  rates 
and low real user costs. The 1980s,  however, challenge  this view: real 
house prices did not fall to their 1970  level, as the increase in real user 
costs suggests  they should  have. 
Demographic  changes provide a possible explanation  for the failure 
of house prices to decline in the 1980s.  There  is a strong  statistical  rela- 
tionship  for the United States as a whole between  the level of real  house 
prices  and  the housing  demand  predicted  by the age structure  of the pop- 
ulation.  There  have been many  attempts  to demonstrate  that  this simple 
relationship  is spurious,6'  and the results in this paper  indicate  that the 
demography-house  price link does not hold across SMSAs. These re- 
sults suggest  caution  in extrapolating  historical  patterns  of house prices 
and demography  far into the future, particularly  when such forecasts 
suggest  dramatic  changes  in real  house prices. 
Despite its limitations, the demography-based  account of recent 
house price changes can only be displaced  ultimately  by an alternative 
explanation  of house price dynamics. One possibility  that is suggested 
by the forecastability  of house prices and that is consistent with earlier 
61. See Hamilton  (1991)  and  DiPasquale  and  Wheaton  (1990),  as well as the rejoinder 
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survey  evidence is that  investors in owner-occupied  homes do not have 
rational  expectations,  but  extrapolate  the past in estimating  the prospec- 
tive capital gains on housing. This could explain the relatively robust 
performance  of house prices in the 1980s, since investors had not yet 
recognized that real user costs were substantially  higher than in the 
1970s. It also implies that the aftermath  of declining house prices in 
many regions during  the late 1980s  could be a period of slack housing 
demand,  as many  potential  homebuyers  extrapolate  recent  price  reduc- 
tions and  conclude  that  house prices will continue  to fall. Comments 
and Discussion 
David  N. Weil: James  Poterba  has  written  an  interesting  paper  that  uses 
some clever approaches  to examine a very important  issue. The paper 
aims to use disaggregated  data (both  at the city level and at the level of 
individual  houses) to test some of the hypotheses that try to explain 
housing  prices at the aggregate  level. 
The author  spends his largest  effort assessing what he calls the real 
user cost model of housing  prices. This is the view that changes in the 
after-tax  user cost of housing  are responsible  for large  shifts in housing 
demand  and  that  these demand  shifts  in turn  explain  a large  part  of hous- 
ing price movements. 
One way of testing  the user cost view is by taking  advantage  of shifts 
in the user cost of housing  that  have affected  different  parts  of the popu- 
lation differently. If these subsets of the population  demand  different 
sorts of housing,  one might  expect the prices of these types of houses to 
diverge.  The author  divides the population  by income:  the high  inflation 
of the late 1970s lowered the after-tax user cost of housing for the 
wealthy by more than  it lowered the user cost for the nonwealthy;  this 
was because the wealthy  are in higher  tax brackets  and  nominal  interest 
was deductible.  The user  cost model  thus  predicts  that  demand  for hous- 
ing  by the wealthy  would  have gone up  by more  than  demand  by the non- 
wealthy in the late 1970s.  Here the author's  model appears  successful. 
Poterba  looks at the difference  in appreciation  between starter  homes 
and  trade-up  homes (using  the Census Bureau's  hedonic  house price  es- 
timates)  and between inexpensive houses and expensive houses (using 
data  on repeat  sales). In both cases he finds  that  in the 1970s  the houses 
that experienced  larger  declines in user cost appreciated  more quickly. 
The success of the user cost model in cross section makes the user cost 
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model an appealing  explanation  of the run-up  in aggregate  prices during 
the 1970s,  when aggregate  user costs were falling. 
But the picture  that  Poterba  paints  is not without  flaws. One  problem 
with the real  user cost view is aggregate  house prices in the 1980s.  If one 
is to believe that  a decline  in user costs was responsible  for the run-up  in 
prices in the 1970s,  then the increase in user costs in the 1980s  (which 
was nearly  twice as large  as the decrease in the 1970s)  might  have been 
expected to produce  a huge decline in prices over the past decade. 
But in the 1980s  the user cost model also has problems  explaining  the 
cross section of changes  in housing  prices. The author's  table 2 looks at 
the differential  between starter  and trade-up  homes based on the he- 
donic index. Adding  up the total  change  from 1980  to 1989,  the evidence 
suggests  little change  in the relative  price of starter  and trade-up  homes 
over the decade, despite the fact that table 1 shows that real user costs 
increased  more  than  twice as much  for high-income  families  as for mid- 
dle- or low-income  families. 
Another  problem  with the user cost model is that there  may be an al- 
ternative  explanation  for the divergence  between price movements of 
expensive  homes  and  those of inexpensive  homes. In the 1970s,  low user 
costs were a product  of high inflation  and high nominal  interest rates. 
Holding  the real  interest  rate  constant,  an important  effect of high  nomi- 
nal interest  rates is to increase  the extent to which the real  payments  on 
a mortgage  are  front-loaded.  In other  words, high  inflation  has the effect 
of exacerbating  the liquidity  "squeeze"  associated with paying a mort- 
gage. One  would  expect that  this liquidity-squeeze  effect would  be more 
important  to people at the lower end of the housing  market  and would 
thus provide another  reason why the prices of expensive homes rose 
more rapidly in the 1970s. Similarly, this liquidity problem might be 
more  important  for people buying  first  homes than  for those trading  up. 
For example,  in the Chicago  Title and  Trust  survey  of recent  home buy- 
ers for 1985,  mortgage  payments  averaged  33  percent  of income  for first- 
time home buyers  but averaged  28 percent  of income for repeat  buyers. 
In terms  of its cross sectional  predictions,  the inflation-effects  model 
resembles  Poterba's  user cost model  for the 1970s.  For the 1980s,  it pre- 
dicts a less dramatic  reversal  of the differential  between high-priced  and 
low-priced  homes, because the effects of reduced  inflation  are not com- 
pounded  by the effects of tax reductions.  At the aggregate  level, the in- 
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should have had a negative effect on prices in the 1970s  and a positive 
effect in the 1980s. 
Another  hypothesis that is examined  by Poterba  is the demographic 
hypothesis about housing prices at the national  level, which has been 
advanced by Gregory  Mankiw  and myself, among others. The demo- 
graphic  hypothesis and the user cost hypothesis are not essentially dif- 
ferent in spirit-in  arguing  that shifts in demand explain large price 
movements,  both  hypotheses  rely on a fairly  inelastic  supply  of housing. 
The demographic  hypothesis suggests that aggregate  movements in 
housing  prices  can  be explained  by changes  in the rate  of growth  of hous- 
ing demand  resulting  from the predictable  aging  of the population-for 
example, the high  rate  of price growth  in the 1970s  was due to the entry 
of the postwar  baby boom cohort  into its house-buying  years. 
Poterba suggests that this hypothesis can be checked by looking at 
demographic  changes and house prices in cities. Specifically,  he calcu- 
lates for each city the rate at which Mankiw-Weil  housing demand 
(which  is essentially  the same  as the adult  population)  would  have grown 
over the 1980s,  based on the age structure  of the population  that  existed 
in 1980.  Mankiw  and  I showed  that  at the national level this sort of fore- 
cast comes very close to the growth rate of actual  demand.' Poterba 
finds essentially no relation between the rate of growth of his demo- 
graphic  variable  and actual  house price movements  over the 1980s.  He 
believes this finding  casts doubt on the demographic  explanation  for 
house price movements  at the aggregate  level. 
I think  that  the problem  with  this analysis  is that  it underestimates  the 
huge importance  of immigration  at the city, as opposed to the national, 
level. To give a feel for the potential  importance  of migration,  in 1985, 
16  percent  of individuals  in the 25- to 29-year-old  age group  were living 
in a state different  than  the one they had  lived in during  1980,  and a fur- 
ther 17 percent were living in a different  county in the same state. (By 
contrast,  only 3 percent  had  lived abroad  five years earlier.) 
Thus movements in population should be large enough to swamp 
changes  in the size of a city's adult  population  resulting  from  natural  in- 
crease. Further,  these population  movements are almost certainly  de- 
pendent  on economic  outcomes  in the cities where  people move. For ex- 
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ample, between 1980  and 1985,  the population  of Texas increased  at an 
annual  rate of 2.9 percent, over half of which was accounted  for by net 
in-migration.  Between 1985  and 1988,  the population  only increased  at 
an annual  rate  of 0.9 percent, and net migration  was negative.2 
Thus, not only do I think  that the use of Poterba's  demographic  vari- 
able as a test of the demographic  hypothesis  about  housing  prices at the 
national  level is flawed, but I also think that the coefficient on income 
per capita  in his cross-city  regressions  is difficult  to interpret.  This coef- 
ficient should  not be thought  of as giving information  about the income 
elasticity of the demand  of individual  residents  of a city. Rather  it con- 
veys a combination  of this income elasticity of demand  and the income 
elasticity  of in-migration.  If it is true  that  migration  greatly  increases  the 
estimated  effect of income  growth  on house prices  in a cross section, one 
implication  is that  income growth  will not predict  house price  growth  in 
time series regressions  as well as it does in cross section. 
Another  place where the problem  of migration  comes up is in the re- 
gressions  examining  the persistence  of shocks to income  per  capita.  Pot- 
erba finds that shocks to the growth rate of income per capita are not 
persistent  enough  to explain  the large  house price  movements  observed 
in the data. But housing  demand  should  depend  not only on income per 
capita  but also on the total number  of people in the city. If migration  is 
very income elastic, small changes in income per capita may lead to 
large increases in population,  and thus may justify large increases in 
house prices. Thus  one set of regressions  that  I would  like to see is a test 
of the time series properties  of total income rather  than of income per 
capita. If shocks to the growth  rate of total income are persistent,  there 
may indeed  be a good explanation  for the observed  movements  in house 
prices. 
Let me now discuss one way to put together  the different  pieces of 
this paper. The evidence that Poterba  presents on shocks to the con- 
struction  cost index seems to show that  changes  in cost can explain  only 
a part  of house price movements  at the aggregate  level. Further,  it is not 
clear what fraction  of the observed shocks to cost are exogenous (for 
example, changes in the price of lumber)  as opposed to endogenous 
2. Migration  data  in the preceding  paragraphs  are from  the Statistical  Abstract  of the 
United  States, 1987,  tables  27 and  29, and 1990,  table  27. 188  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
(changes in construction  wages). And shocks to lumber  prices are not 
going to explain the huge variance in price changes across cities or 
across different  types of houses within  a city. 
On the other hand, the evidence on the decline in construction  that 
has taken  place in response  to the current  decline  in prices seems to indi- 
cate that  supply  is fairly  elastic. This  presents  a problem,  because if sup- 
ply is elastic, it is hard  to get any model  to produce  large  changes  in price 
in response to a demand  shock. It is especially hard  to get such move- 
ments in a forward-looking  model, where the expected future  supply  re- 
sponse keeps current  prices from  moving  too much. 
On  the demand  side, there  are some stories-the  user cost model  and 
the demographic  model-that  explain some shifts in demand. The de- 
mographic  model  does well at the aggregate  level, but, as Poterba  points 
out, it goes the wrong  way in explaining  the differential  appreciation  of 
starter  versus trade-up  homes in the 1970s.  The user cost model does a 
good  job of explaining  this differential  appreciation  in the 1970s  but not 
in the 1980s.  Neither  model  does much  to explain  the cross-city  variance 
of price movements. 
So how can one explain  why prices in Providence,  Rhode Island, in- 
creased 70 percent in two years? Poterba's evidence that shocks to 
growth  rates of income per capita are not persistent  makes it seem un- 
likely that big revisions in projected  demand  growth  would be rational. 
Including  the effect of income growth  on migration  would increase the 
expected size of the revisions  in demand  growth  (and  thus price)-but  I 
do not think  that  this could do the  job either. 
It seems to me that  economists  are  going  to have to bite the bullet  and 
look at models that  allow for not-fully-rational  expectations:  people see 
rising prices, and they calculate that the user cost of housing is low, 
without  recognizing  that  the path  of prices is not on a stable  arm  leading 
to some steady state. Furthermore,  this process is observed  more  on the 
upside  than  on the downside,  because of an  apparent  downward  nominal 
rigidity  in house prices. 
Poterba's  evidence that excess returns  to holding  housing  are some- 
what predictable  on the basis of lagged variables-which  they should 
not be in an efficient  asset market-is  further  reason  to consider  expec- 
tation formation  as an empirical  rather  than a theoretical  matter.  This 
seems to be the direction  that  Poterba  is heading  at the end of the paper. 
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Robert Shiller: This paper by James Poterba makes two important 
points: over time house prices move a great  deal, and they move inde- 
pendently  of construction  costs. These movements  in price  around  con- 
struction  cost are  partially,  but  not completely,  correlated  with  changing 
user costs. The differences  across cities in growth  rates in house prices 
can be explained  only partially  in terms  of a set of rational  or fundamen- 
tal factors. Housing  prices are  not set in an efficient  market  and  are only 
partially  forward  looking.  There  appears  to be a purely  speculative  com- 
ponent  of real  estate prices. 
I can think of several other things that Poterba  might have done to 
establish  these points  more solidly, approaches  to these data  that  might 
be more  rigorous,  but  had  he done them  he would  not have had  room  for 
the splendidly  broad  and  comprehensive  view of the housing  market  that 
he has provided.  The main  limitation  of this paper  is that  the results  are 
sometimes of questionable  statistical significance  when the paucity of 
effectively independent  observations  is accounted for. This is not Po- 
terba's fault; it is the impossibility  theorem of macroeconomics  once 
again:  any question  that is truly  interesting  is essentially unanswerable 
because it concerns either  very infrequent  events, long swings, or low- 
frequency  movements,  for which there  are  few effective observations. 
Construction  Costs and Land Prices 
It is important  to look at construction  costs to learn  about  the ultimate 
source of real estate price movements. Suppose one learned that the 
price  of construction  in the United States was highly  correlated  with the 
price of housing  and  that  the cost of construction  was driven  by lumber 
prices, which  in turn  were driven  by weather  events, such as a hurricane 
that  destroyed  part  of the nation's  forests. Then, a simple  interpretation 
for house price  movements  is possible. This, however, is not the kind  of 
result  Poterba  finds. He finds  that the increase  in the price-to-cost  ratio 
from 1970  to 1980  accounted  for half  of the increase  in U.S. house prices 
relative  to the GNP deflator. 
Clearly,  though,  prices  cannot  be highly  correlated  with  a variation  in 
world-market  construction  costs-the  fact that  prices have moved very 
differently  from  one region  of the country  to another  and  from  one coun- 
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There is also good reason to suspect, before even looking at the data, 
that exogenous interregional  shifts in construction  costs are not the pri- 
mary  cause of interregional  differences  in house price changes. The in- 
terregional  differences  in house price movements  in the sample  period 
have been enormous, and no stories come to mind that would explain 
these differences  in terms  of exogenous cost changes. There  have been 
no stories of precipitous  increases in the monopoly  power ot construc- 
tion unions in certain  regions, no stories of natural  disasters  that made 
it suddenly more difficult  for construction  to take place in certain re- 
gions, and  no major  hurricanes. 
The correlation that Poterba does observe between construction 
costs and prices may be driven  primarily  from  housing  demand  to con- 
struction  costs. When  demand  for houses in the United States picks up, 
the price of construction  labor  rises, so too does the price of construc- 
tion materials  in the U.S. market  relative to the world market,  and so 
too do the prices of construction  materials  in the world market,  given 
the importance  of the United States in the world  economy. 
Poterba  presents  only aggregate  national  data  on the relation  of house 
prices to construction  costs through  time;  I would  think  that  if he looked 
separately at regions, say the Northeast or California,  he would see 
more  variation  in the ratio  of house price to construction  costs. 
His analysis  of the relation  of house prices to land  prices  offers a nice 
contrast  to his analysis of construction  costs. Land is the one input to 
housing  construction  that  is totally  immobile;  there  are  no substitutes  on 
the world market  nor is there any production  of it. If house prices are 
highly  correlated  with land  prices, it suggests that little of the variation 
in house-cum-land  prices is directly  associated  with exogenous changes 
in construction  costs, but rather  such changes are associated with de- 
mand  changes. In this vein, Poterba  presents some unexpected  results. 
He finds substantial  correlation  between house prices and land costs 
across cities, but finds very little correlation  through time, over five- 
year intervals, between changes in house prices and changes in land 
prices. The first  correlation  supports  the demand  change story;  the sec- 
ond does not. Perhaps  the second reflects  the relative  inaccuracy  of the 
Urban  Land  Institute  (ULI) land  price series; measurement  error  might 
make it particularly  inaccurate  over short intervals. In judging  the po- 
tential  for inaccuracies  in this series, recall that the land that should  be 
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under  the typical house. For example, what is scarce about a house in 
an expensive neighborhood  is the neighborhood  itself; the same house 
in a different  neighborhood  might  have a significantly  lower price. Con- 
sider  the fact that  when  land  is undeveloped  there  is probably  a good rea- 
son why; hence the price  of undeveloped  land  may  differ  from  that  of the 
land  with houses on it. 
Starter and Trade-up Houses 
Poterba  finds some convergence  in results using two different  meth- 
ods and data sets. Using the hedonic, constant-quality  index data, he 
finds  that  between 1977  and 1980  the prices  of trade-up  houses rose more 
than those of starter  houses; using repeat-sales  data he finds that be- 
tween the early 1970s  and early 1980s  the price of a top-quartile  house 
increased  more than  the price of a bottom-quartile  house. Thus, he ap- 
pears  to have confirmed  that  large  or expensive houses appreciated  rela- 
tively more  over this period. 
He admits  that  he does not have a clear  theory  about  which direction 
house prices  should  have moved over the 1970s  and 1980s.  The real  user 
cost analysis suggests that the prices of expensive homes should have 
risen  as they did toward  the end of the 1970s,  whereas  the demographic 
story would suggest the opposite. To know how these relative price 
movements  might  make sense, more data are needed so that a satisfac- 
tory  multiple  regression  analysis  of both  user  cost and  demographics  can 
be applied.  But the present  shortage  of data  unfortunately  means  that  it 
may take years to get substantially  more U.S. data; perhaps  interna- 
tional  data  could provide  greater  insight  now. 
It was a clever idea  to use the hedonic  regression  coefficients  from  the 
constant-quality  index regression to  produce separate indexes for 
starter  and  trade-up  homes. The  results  probably  have the interpretation 
the author  claims, but let me raise some doubts. 
The Census  Bureau's  constant-quality  index prices new houses only. 
This presents  a problem  if the index is to be used to infer  the prices  of all 
houses. Referring  to Poterba's  model, equation  3 says that  construction 
will tend to occur only when house prices are higher  than  construction 
costs. In a city where housing  prices are generally  lower than  construc- 
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of the city where demand  is unusually  high or will occur in styles of 
homes that are in particular  demand.  Moreover, even when prices are 
higher  than construction  costs for all houses, construction  will tend to 
occur  in regions  of the city or in styles of houses where  the ratio  of house 
price  to construction  cost is highest.  Consider  an extreme  story  in which 
the construction  industry  is completely  mobile  and  flexible. It will build 
homes only in styles and in regions with the highest available  ratio of 
house price to construction  cost; this arbitraging  in the construction 
market will keep this ratio the same everywhere and for all kinds of 
houses. Under  this assumption,  there  will be no variation  in the ratio  of 
price to cost for starter  homes versus trade-up  homes as measured  by 
Poterba.  If Poterba's  interpretation  of these data  is correct, why would 
construction  be undertaken  for starter  homes when their  price is lower 
relative  to construction  cost than  the prices of other, larger  homes that 
could be built?  Presumably  builders  specialize  to some degree  between 
starter  and  trade-up  homes, so that  they cannot  completely  switch  from 
building  one to the other. Because the construction  industry  tends to 
build  homes that promise  the highest  price relative  to cost, the charac- 
teristics of homes change through  time in a systematic way. If these 
changing  characteristics  are measured  by right-hand  variables  in the he- 
donic regressions,  the effect of these variations  on the bias in price will 
tend to be reduced. On the other hand, the changing  characteristics  of 
houses that are actually  built are not likely to be captured  by observed 
hedonic  variables. 
It is a common  problem  with hedonic regression  index methods  that 
the indexes may not be good if there  are unobserved  hedonic  variables. 
One  example  from  the constant-quality  construction  index  will illustrate 
this problem.  The coefficient  on the variable  denoting  central  air  condi- 
tioning  in the Census Bureau's  constant-quality  regression  of log price 
on characteristics  has recently had the wrong sign in the West. Homes 
with central  air  conditioning  are, according  to the regression,  less  valu- 
able than  homes without  it. One  interpretation  might  be that  homes near 
the shore need less air conditioning  yet are also more valuable  because 
they are  near  the shore.  In Poterba's  specifications,  only trade-up  homes 
have central air conditioning;  therefore, if the negative bias in the air 
conditioning  coefficient  changes through  time, his estimate of the rela- 
tive movement  of starter  and  trade-up  house prices  will be inaccurate.  It 
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biases in the index might  be; I suspect that his starter  and trade-up  in- 
dexes can be trusted  only for the broadest  outlines of the relative  price 
movements. 
Explaining Intercity  Variation in House  Price  Changes 
There  has been so much  puzzlement  over the recent changes  in rela- 
tive prices in different  parts  of the country  that Poterba's  efforts to ex- 
plain them should be welcomed. He should not have been expected, 
however, to succeed in fully explaining  why the Northeast  underwent  a 
spectacular  boom in the mid-1980s  and why California  underwent  a 
boom  in the late 1980s;  no one else seems to know  why these booms  hap- 
pened when they did. Poterba  does achieve some success in explaining 
intercity  variation  in house price movements in his cross-sectional  re- 
gression,  table  5. He does not make  it clear  whether  a regression  like this 
could fit the aforementioned  booms; the dependent  variable  is just the 
change  in house prices over the decade, a time interval  not fine enough 
to say much about timing.  Nor does he say whether  the regression  fits 
California  or the Northeast;  maybe  it explains  just the normal  variation 
in house price changes  and  not the booms. 
In interpreting  the relatively  high  R2  in the cross-sectional  regression 
in table 5, it should also be remembered  that the right-hand-side  vari- 
ables include  the change  in the log of construction  cost. As noted  above, 
construction  cost probably  proxies in large  part  for price  itself, because 
of the feedback  from  price  to cost. Note that  the change  in the log of con- 
struction  cost always gets a coefficient  fairly  close to one. 
The standard  errors  reported  in table  5 probably  cannot  be trusted  be- 
cause of spatial  (not serial)  correlation  of the residuals.  All the cities in 
the West would be expected to move somewhat together; the same 
would be true in other regions. It may not be possible to correct these 
standard  errors  and  still  get significant  results  because of the shortage  of 
data. 
Are House  Prices  Forward Looking? 
To some extent, house prices  must  be forward  looking.  When  people 
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some of them  will surely  respond  to the information.  Still, the big ques- 
tion remains-how  strongly  and reliably  forward  looking  is the market? 
N. Gregory  Mankiw  and David Weil, for example, asserted from their 
study of housing  prices that prices do not seem to incorporate  basic in- 
formation  about  demographics  that  could have been forecasted  20 years 
ahead.  ' 
Poterba  cites the example  of real estate prices in Berlin;  house prices 
in Berlin  are reported  to have risen 5 percent  within  a week of the selec- 
tion of Berlin  as the new capital  of Germany.  This is a nice story; there 
do not seem to be many stories of such sudden  price movements  in the 
market  for houses, so I thought  it was an important  piece of evidence. 
The June  20, 1991,  vote in the Bundestag  to move the capital  had  a well- 
defined  timing:  the date  of the vote (though  not the outcome)  was known 
in advance. By comparing  prices shortly  before and after  that  date, one 
can single out the effects of that  decision, since factors unrelated  to the 
decision are unlikely  to have changed  much at  just that time. Poterba's 
method  here is well-enshrined  in finance-it  is called an event study. 
The source Poterba  gives for this story  does not seem fully reliable  (a 
newspaper  citation), so I asked my research  assistant, Gerwin  Bell, to 
do some simple  checking;  he spoke to three  real  estate brokers  in Berlin. 
The brokers  had  to be prodded  to comment  on price  changes  during  the 
day or week of the announcement,  preferring  to discuss longer-term 
trends  in housing  prices;  one claimed  we were asking  a silly question.  In 
fact, brokers  really  have no accurate  way of telling  whether  prices have 
changed  in any given day or week, since there  are so few sales and  since 
the quality  of real estate is so heterogeneous.  Nonetheless, these bro- 
kers did say that they were aware of a sharp  increase in condominium 
prices in West Berlin  within  weeks of the announcement.  Two of them 
were willing to venture that they sensed that there was a jump on the 
announcement  day, but they also said that it was not a one-shot in- 
crease, that  prices  kept increasing  for at least a week after  that, by more 
than 20 percent  within  two weeks according  to one broker.  Two of the 
three  brokers  reported  that  a few of their  clients called them on the day 
of the announcement  asking  to increase  their  asking  price;  the other  said 
he received no such calls. One of them said that he himself had called 
clients that  day, prodding  them to increase  their  asking  price. I take the 
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brokers' comments as evidence supporting  the general notion of Po- 
terba's story about  Berlin, although  they do suggest  that  the price  jump 
was not instantaneous. 
That  prices  jumped  up so soon after  the Bundestag'  s decision  appears 
to be solid evidence that  prices respond  fairly  quickly  to some informa- 
tion. The evidence is consistent  with the notion  that  real estate markets 
are efficient;  however, it is really  not very impressive  evidencefor effi- 
ciency. Surely, people who were shopping  for homes in Berlin  on that 
day sensed a new urgency  to buy; those who were selling  must  have sus- 
pected a new pickup  in demand  given the prominent  stories  in the news- 
papers  that  there  would  be some difficulty  finding  places  to work  and  live 
with the government  moving to Berlin. But this does not mean that 
prices were at the right  level either  before or after  the date of the deci- 
sion, nor does it mean that prices increased  by the right  amount  in re- 
sponse to the new information.  Most event studies  in finance  are subject 
to the same limitation;  they may discover that stock prices  jump up in 
response to some news event, such as a positive-earnings  announce- 
ment, but the studies generally do not have any way of confirming 
whether  the price after  the announcement,  or the price change, was ap- 
propriate.  Thus, event studies typically do nothing  more than confirm 
the obvious-prices  respond  to information. 
Estimating  an equation  like Poterba's  equation 10 suffers  from vari- 
ous technical problems. The price at time t is, according  to theory, a 
forecast of the present value at time t of some fundamental  variable, 
such as implicit  rent  on housing.  The change  in price  between  t -  1  and  t 
is therefore  the forecast  at time  t of the present  value of the fundamental 
variable  starting  at t minus  the forecast at t  -  1 of the present value of 
the fundamental  variable  starting  at t -  1. In equation  10,  the timing  and 
definitions  differ:  the change  in the fundamental  variable  (not  its present 
value) between t -  1 and t is regressed  on the change  in price between 
t  -  2 and t  -  1. Efficient-markets  theory has nothing  to say, strictly 
speaking,  on whether  the coefficient should  be positive, zero, or nega- 
tive. Of  course, the notion  that  prices  are  forward  looking  might  suggest 
that they would survive  in a regression  like this. 
The alternative  theory, that  house prices  are  not efficient,  also has no 
clear  implications  for the coefficient  on the change  in house price. Many 
variables  help forecast macroeconomic  variables, even if they are not 
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regression  with significance  just because they are  a smoother  series than 
per capita  income  itself; they might  proxy for a longer  distributed  lag on 
changes  in growth  rates in per capita  income. 
It was an ingenious  idea to compute  a stock price index for each city 
using  industry  indexes and  data  on the breakdown  of employment  by in- 
dustry in the city. Clearly, these city indexes are likely dominated  by 
the aggregate  stock market;  as Poterba  points out, the cross-sectional 
variation  is low for these indexes. Thus, it is important  to note that he 
included  separate  dummies  for time effects and city effects in the table 
10  regressions.  From  the fact that  the coefficient  on the lagged  change  in 
stock prices remains  significant  when the dummies  are included  in the 
regression, one can conclude that the time series cross-section results 
in table 10 are not dominated  by the time series components. Thus, 
Poterba  is right  in concluding  that  the significance  of the city stock-price 
variable  is informative  about  the stock market's  ability  to predict  inter- 
city changes  and  is not  just saying  that  the stock market  is a leading  indi- 
cator for the aggregate  economy. However, the significance  of any of 
these coefficients should  be judged with caution since the standard  er- 
rors  do not take account  of the time series and  cross-sectional  nature  of 
the data  and of the spatial  correlation  of house prices. 
Do  House  Prices  Go Down? 
Poterba  devotes a section of his paper  to whether  house prices  can go 
down. On the face of it, this seems an odd question to ask; certainly 
these prices cannot only go up. Apparently  he is merely addressing  a 
popular  misconception  and stressing  how wrong  the conception  is. But 
is there  really  such a misconception?  Karl  Case and  I did  a questionnaire 
survey of home buyers in various cities in 1988, including  California 
where nominal prices had shown essentially uninterrupted  price in- 
creases for decades and  were currently  booming.2  We asked, "Buying  a 
home in your city today involves (a) a great  deal of risk, (b) some risk, 
or (c) little or no risk."  Of our California  respondents,  60 percent  chose 
little or no risk, and only 4 percent chose a great  deal of risk. Still, it is 
noteworthy  that even in this boom situation  40 percent of respondents 
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were aware  of at least some risk. In Boston, which at the same time was 
in the immediate  aftermath  of a boom, only 37  percent  thought  there  was 
little or no risk. Declining  prices serve to disabuse most people of the 
notion  that  there  is no risk  in real  estate investment. 
Incidentally,  the evidence on actual  asymmetry  of price changes re- 
ported  in table  7 is of questionable  significance.  Because of spatial  corre- 
lation of price changes, there are far fewer effectively independent  ob- 
servations  here than  it would  appear. 
The Predictability  of Excess  Returns 
The regressions  in table 11, confirming  the forecastability  of excess 
returns  to housing  over Treasury  bills, show that  it is very important  for 
prospective  home  buyers  to try to time  the purchase  of their  homes. The 
coefficient on the one-year lagged excess return  is around  a half in all 
of the regressions,  indicating  substantial  forecastability  and substantial 
incentives to respond  to the real estate situation  over the past year. It 
should be stressed, however, that these regressions  are not direct evi- 
dence of whether  real housing  prices can be forecasted. There  has been 
substantial  forecastability  of real interest  rates over this period, and so 
there is an implied  forecastability  of excess returns  to housing, unless 
the behavior  of real housing  prices is such that it offsets the effects of 
changed  real  interest  rates. 
General Discussion 
Robert  Gordon  reasoned  that the different  dynamics  of house prices 
and  quantities  before  and  after 1982  could be explained  by the deregula- 
tion of financial  institutions. Before the 1980s, much of the impact of 
monetary  policy came through  disintermediation.  Because tight  money 
raised  market  interest  rates, attracting  deposits out of the thrift  institu- 
tions and forcing  them to reduce the volume of home mortgages,  it had 
a major  effect on the timing  of movements in both housing  prices and 
construction.  By the 1980s  financial  deregulation  had  largely  eliminated 
this mechanism, smoothing  the path of both construction  and prices. 
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been important  for understanding  construction. In addition  to the re- 
duced risk of disintermediation,  he noted that the better integration  of 
the mortgage  market  with other  financial  markets  and the development 
of the adjustable-rate  mortgage  were other  innovations  making  the 1980s 
different  from  earlier  periods.  Poterba  believed  that  such changes  would 
mainly  result  in less cyclical variation  in housing  investment  and would 
not affect the equilibrium  size of the housing stock. Gordon  also sug- 
gested that neither land prices nor dwelling prices were properly ad- 
justed for quality  differences.  He cited work  by Paul  Pieper  showing  that 
higher-priced  homes had more amenities, such as pools, that were not 
properly  adjusted  for;  he also observed  that  the raw  land  was unlikely  to 
be of constant  quality,  precisely because it had not yet been developed. 
Lawrence  Katz suggested  that the environmental  movement  and  the 
increase  of land-use  regulations,  which restricted  new developments  in 
primarily  wealthy  areas, could help explain  the huge  increase  in housing 
prices in the 1970s.  Anthony  Downs agreed  with the importance  of such 
supply-side  constraints  but  did not believe their  effects were confined  to 
the late 1970s,  even though  that is when they began. He reported  that a 
recent  study  in California  showed  that  growth  management  intensified  in 
the 1980s,  roughly  coinciding  with the run-up  in prices in the late 1980s. 
Downs believed such restrictions  could help explain  price divergences 
between regions  of the country  but conceded that  it was not possible to 
quantify  their  importance  for cross-sectional  analysis. 
Joseph Stiglitz  observed that the market  for housing  is an asset mar- 
ket where expectations of future price changes influence  demand but 
where  transactions  costs and  other  frictions  as well as liquidity  problems 
may  all  be important  in causing  the market  to depart  from  the predictions 
of simple  asset market  theory. He noted  that  the hypothesis  that  housing 
prices behave like the prices of highly  marketable  financial  assets calls 
for looking at the effects of announcements  or anticipated  changes in 
the user  cost of capital,  not the actual  movements.  He also observed  that 
liquidity  effects can  generate  accelerator  effects like those in an expecta- 
tions-based  accelerator  model. In a liquidity-constrained  model, capital 
from rising house prices can be used as down payments to buy larger 
houses, adding  to effective demand, which can push up house prices. 
Robert  Hall  and  Alan  Blinder  noted  that  people appear  to care  a lot more 
about  avoiding  losses than making  gains and that this could explain  the 
asymmetrical  behavior of housing prices. Stiglitz replied that in other James M. Poterba  199 
countries  one did see decreases in housing  prices, suggesting  that the 
asymmetry  should  not be explained  in terms of a different  psychology. 
Rather,  it may be that expectations are based on previous experience 
and so can be self-perpetuating. 
Poterba responded to David Weil's observation that immigration, 
which Poterba  did not account  for, would dominate  other  demographic 
factors  in state cross sections. Poterba  reported  that  net migration  flows 
are  much  smaller  than  the gross migration  flows cited by Weil  and noted 
that  the effect of demographic  changes  on housing  prices tend to be off- 
set by changes  in migration. 200  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
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